Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks by Vuk, William T.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 21, Issue 3 1997 Article 9
Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why
the European Union Should Revise the 1989
Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution
Protection for Trademarks
William T. Vuk∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why
the European Union Should Revise the 1989
Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution
Protection for Trademarks
William T. Vuk
Abstract
This Note argues that the European Union must harmonize the protection afforded trademarks
against dilution, and that the European Union should adopt legislation similar to the U.S. Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Part I discusses pertinent aspects of US and EU trademark law.
Part I also describes the dilution doctrine and reviews the US and EU approaches to dilution. Part
II presents the debate on whether to provide trademarks protection from dilution. Part III argues
that the European Union should adopt a dilution statute similar to the Lanham Act’s dilution pro-
vision because dilution protection is necessary to fully protect trademarks. Part III also asserts
that only famous marks, as the United States defines them, should be offered dilution protection in
the European Union. This Note concludes that the European Union should revise the Trademark
Directive, defining the phrase ‘likelihood of association’ or deleting the phrase ’likelihood of as-
sociation’ and replacing it with a phrase that grants all famous trademarks protection from uses
that cause dilution.
PROTECTING BAYWATCH AND WAGAMAMA: WHY THE
EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD REVISE THE 1989
TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE TO MANDATE DILUTION
PROTECTION FOR TRADEMARKS
William T. Vuk*
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers have used trademarks' as indicators of their
goods' source of origin foi hundreds of years.2 In order to pro-
tect a trademark owner's interests in the source identifying func-
tion of a trademark, governments offered trademarks legal pro-
tection against uses that resulted in a likelihood of confusion.'
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
dedicate this Note to the memories of my grandmother, Mildred Thomas, and my best
friend, Betsy.
1. See Trademark Act of 1946 § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997) [hereinafter Lanham
Act] (defining term trademark). A trademark is
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies
to register on the principal register established by this Act,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.
Id.; First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Trade Marks, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter Trademark Directive] (stating
that trademarks "may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically...
provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of another undertaking."); 1994 UK Trade Marks Act § 1 (1)
(defining trademark as "any sign capable of being represented graphically which is ca-
pable of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from those of other under-
taking."); Uniform Benelux Trademark Law art. 1 (1971) (stating that "the following
shall be considered individual [trade]marks: designations, designs, prints, seals, letters,
numbers, shapes of goods or their get-up, and any other symbols which serve to distin-
guish the goods of an enterprise."); BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1493 (6th ed. 1990) (stat-
ing that trademark is "a distinctive mark of authenticity, through which the products of
particular manufacturers . . . may be distinguished from those of others.").
2. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 5.01, at 1-18 (3d ed. & Supp. 1996) (noting that humans have utilized trade-
marks for thousands of years); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning
Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REv. 29, 33 (1910) (discussing how French trademarks were
granted legal protection against infringement as early as thirteenth century). McCarthy
states that the earliest forms of markings were the brands placed on cattle and other
animals. 1 McCARTHY, supra, § 5.01, at 1-2.
3. See BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 5.01, at 171 (stating that Lanham Act originally only provided trademark owners with
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The function of trademarks, however, expanded over time and
now trademarks serve as guarantors of the quality of the trade-
marked good,4 embodiments of the trademark owner's good
will,5 and'advertising entities.6 To amply protect these addi-
tional trademark functions, courts and legislatures have begun
to protect trademarks from uses that damage trademarks, but do
not result in any likelihood of confusion, namely uses that cause
dilution.' Dilution is defined as the diminishment or reduction
protection in infringement suits when consumers were likely to be confused as to
source of origin of trademarked product); Moon-Ki Chai, Protection of Fragrances Under
the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 368, 373 (1990) (discussing Lanham
Act, which was instituted in 1946, and provided trademark owners with protection
against infringing uses that caused confusion). Under the original trademark laws, a
trademark owner had to establish that an unauthorized user was using a similar trade-
mark on similar goods and that such use resulted in a likelihood of confusion as to the
good's source of origin. PA-rISHALL, supra, § 5.01, at 171.
4. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.01(2), at,3 (stating that trademarks function
as guarantors that all other similar trademarked goods will be of equal level of quality).
5. See 1 id. (stating that trademarks represent good will that trademark owner has
established for trademark); PATrISHALL, supra note 3, § 8.05, at 407 (describing how
trademarks have become mechanisms that generate and represent good will).
6. See Steven H. Hartman, Subliminal Confusion: The Misappropriation of Advertising
Value, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 506, 509 (1988) (stating that trademarks function as advertis-
ing agents because they attract customers and sell goods); Marlene B. Hanson & W.
Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will: The Case for a Federal Standard of Misappropria-
tion, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 480, 484 (1991) (noting that trademarks function in advertis-
ing and product promotion).
7. See Lanham Act §§ 43, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (as amended by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995) (offering trademarks protection against unauthorized
uses that cause dilution of trademark even when likelihood of confusion is not pres-
ent); PATrISHALL, supra note 3, § 8.01, at n.3 (stating that U.S. courts have implicitly
relied upon dilution doctrine when protecting trademarks from infringement). Patti-
shall notes that the court in Stork Restaurant, Inc. V Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948),
utilized the dilution theory to protect a trademark even though there was no statutory
protection offered trademark owners from dilution. Id.; see also Quality Inns Int'l v.
McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988) (protecting McDonald's trademark
under implicit finding of dilution by finding likelihood of confusion when evidence of
confusion was slim); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (protecting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders trademark from use
in pornographic movie even though likelihood of confusion was absent); Trademark
Directive, supra note 1, art. 5, O.J. L 40/1 at 4 2 (1989) (affording trademarks, that
have reputation, protection against uses that damage this reputation regardless of
whether likelihood of confusion is present); Uniform Benelux Trademark Law, art.
13(2) (affording trademarks protection against any economic use that is likely to dam-
age trademark owner); Claeryn/Klarein 7 I.I.C. 420, 426 (1975) (Benelux) (upholding
protection of trademark Claeryn against use of Klarein on dissimilar product because
trademark protection under Uniform Benelux Trademark Act article 13 (a) (1) does not
depend upon finding of public confusion); 1994 UK Trade Marks Act § 10(2) (3) (offer-
ing trademarks protection against uses that result in likelihood of association or that
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of a trademarks ability to clearly distinguish one source, thereby,
creating the perception, in the consumer's mind, that a trade-
mark no longer represents one source of goods because a sec-
ond manufacturer is now using the trademark to represent an-
8other source.
The dilution theory originated in Germany in 1924.' In
1927, the dilution theory was brought to the United States in an
article, entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,10 writ-
ten by Frank I. Schechter." In 1947, trademarks received their
first statutorily recognized protection when the state of Massa-
chusetts enacted a statute prohibiting diluting uses of a trade-
mark. 12  Dilution protection for trademarks was also found
within the 1972 Uniform Trademark Act13 passed by the
take advantage of reputation of trademark or uses that damage trademark's character);
but see Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants PLC, [1995] F.S.R. 713, 730 (UK)
(refusing to extend protection offered by inclusion of phrase likelihood of association
in 1994 Trade Marks Act, section 10(2) to situations where likelihood of confusion is
not present); Baywatch Production Co. Ltd. v. Home Video Channel, [1997] F.S.R. 22,
30 (UK) (interpreting 1994 Trade Marks Act, section 10(3), so as not to grant trade-
marks protection unless likelihood of confusion is present).
8. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927)(defining dilution as whittling away of trademark's distinctivness); 3
McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24.13(1) (a), at 106 (defining dilution as weakening or re-
ducing trademark's ability to distinguish one source from another); Lanham Act § 45,
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services. .. ").
9. See Civil Court, Elberfield, 25Juristische Wochemschrift 503; XXV Markenshutz
Und Wettbewerb 264, September 11, 1925 (Germany) (creating concept of dilution
when protected trademark Odol for mouthwash from use on steel products). The Ger-
man court concluded that consumers would think of the mouthwash whenever they
were exposed to Odol on steel products and, therefore, the Odol trademark would be
diluted. Id. Schechter notes that the Odol decision was based upon general principles
of fair trade and not upon any particular theory of German trademark registration.
Schechter, supra note 8, at 833.
10. 40 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1927).
11. See Julie Arthur Garcia, Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85 TRADE-
MARK REP. 489, 491 (1995) (noting that Frank Schechter introduced theory of dilution
to United States in 1927); Ellen P. Winner, Right ofIdentity: Right of Publicity and Protec-
tion For a Trademark's "Persona", 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 204 (1981) (asserting that
Frank Schechter introduced concept of dilution to United States).
12. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 492 n.19 (noting that Massachusetts enacted first
statute that protected trademarks against dilution in 1947); Preserving History: Trademark
Timeline, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 1021, 1032 (1992) (stating that first dilution statute was
adopted in United States by state of Massachusetts in 1947); Howard J. Shire, Dilution
Versus Deception - Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of In-
fringement, 77 TRADEMARK Rap. 273, 274 n.4 (1987) (commenting that Massachusetts
adopted first dilution statute on May 2, 1947).
13. Uniform Benelux Trademark Law (1972).
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Benelux countries.14 In 1989, the European Union15 ("EU") in-
stituted two provisions which apparently related to dilution pro-
tection into the First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks ("Trademark Di-
rective") ." Both provisions from the Trademark Directive were
14. See Treaty Instituting the Benelux Economic Union, Feb. 3, 1958, Belg.-Lux.-
Neth., 381 U.N.T.S. 165 (establishing union between Belgium, Netherlands, and Lux-
embourg known as Benelux); Uniform Benelux Trademark Law art. 13(a) (2) (describ-
ing rights trademark owner possess against others, including rights against any other
economic use that damages individual's trademark). Article 13(a)(2) of the Benelux
Trademark Act states that
Without prejudice to the possible application of ordinary civil law in matters of
civil liability, the proprietor of a mark may, by virtue of his exclusive right,
oppose:
any other use, in economic intercourse, of the mark or of a like symbol
made without a valid reason under circumstances likely to be prejudicial
to the proprietor of the mark.
Id. The Benelux Courts have interpreted this provision to protect trademarks from
uses on non-similar products even when there was no likelihood of confusion. See
Claeryn, 7 I.I.C. at 426 (interpreting Uniform Benelux Trademark Law as providing
trademarks protection against uses on non-similar goods).
15. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in Treaties Establishing the European Communities (EC Off'l
Pub. Off. 1987)).
16. Trademark Directive, supra note 1. The two provisions that appear to provide
dilution protection state as follows:
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not hav-
ing his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or
services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is regis-
tered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade
mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the
trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and
the trade mark.
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade
any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or
services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered,
where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark.-
Id. art. 5 (1) (a) (b), (2), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989).
Following the completion of this Note, the European Court of Justice interpreted the
phrase "likelihood of association." See Sabel B.V. v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport,
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enacted into United Kingdom17 ("UK") law when they were in-
serted into the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act. 8 In 1995, the U.S.
Congress enacted federal protection for trademarks against uses
that cause dilution when they passed the Federal Trademark Di-
lution Act of 1995.19 In two cases, Waganama20 in 1995 and
Case C-251/95 (not yet published) (available at http://europa.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/
form.pl?lang=en&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=251%2F95&datefe=&datefe=
&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100&Submit=Submit. In their judgment, the
Court ruled rules that "the criterion of 'likelihood of confusion which includes the
likelihood of association with the earlier mark' . . . is to be interpreted as meaning that
the mere association which the public might make between two trademarks as a result
of their analogous semantic content is not in itself a sufficient ground for concluding
that there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of that provision." Id. at
26. The Court continued by stating that "[ilt follows from that wording that the
concept of likelihood of association is not an alternative to that of likelihood of confu-
sion, but serves to define its scope." Id. at 18. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the concept of likelihood of association does not apply "where there is no likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public." Id.
17. See BLACK's LAw DIcroNARY, supra note 1, at 1533 (defining United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland as "[t]he official title of the kingdom composed of Eng-
land, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, and including the colonies and possessions beyond
the seas, under the act of January 1, 1801, effecting the union between Ireland and
Great Britain.").
18. See 1994 UK Trade Marks Act § 10 (implementing infringement provisions
from Trademark Directive into UK law). Section 10 reads in relevant part:
10(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign
which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identi-
cal with those for which it is registered.
(2) A person infringes a trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign where
because -
(a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or
services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, or
(b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services
identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, there exists
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood
of association with the trade mark.
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign
which -
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are riot similar to those for which
the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign,
being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark.
Id. at § 10(1)(2) (3).
19. See Clinton Hein, Confused About Federal Trademark Dilution?, 87 TRADEMARK
REp. 370, 370 (1997) (stating that on January 16, 1996 Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 was signed into law). The Federal Dilution Trademark Act amended the Lan-
ham Act by adding the following subsection:
(c) (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
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Baywatch2 1 in 1997, the UK's Chancery Division interpreted the
newly enacted section 10 of the UK Trade Marks Act as not ex-
panding the protection afforded trademarks to situations where
there was no showing of a likelihood of confusion.2 2
This Note argues that the European Union must harmonize
the protection afforded trademarks against dilution, and that
the European Union should adopt legislation similar to the U.S.
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Part I discusses perti-
nent aspects of U.S. and EU trademark law. Part I also describes
the dilution doctrine and reviews the U.S. and EU approaches to
dilution. Part II presents the debate on the reasons of whether
to provide trademarks protection from dilution. Part III argues
that the European Union should adopt a dilution statute similar
to the Lanham Act's 23 dilution provision because dilution pro-
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is
provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Lanham Act § 43(c), 15. U.S.C. § 1125(c).
20. [1995] F.S.R. 713.
21. [1997] F.S.R. 22.
22. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 730 (stating that phrase likelihood of associa-
tion, found in section 10(2) of 1994 Trade Marks Act, did not extend trademark protec-
tion to uses that do not result in confusion as to product origin); Baywatch, [1997]
F.S.R. at 30 (stating that 1994 Trade Marks Act, section 10(3), does not offer trade-
marks protection without finding of likelihood of confusion).
23. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (discussing famous marks). This
section states that
[t] he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
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tection is necessary to fully protect trademarks. Part III also as-
serts that only famous marks, as the U.S. defines them,24 should
be offered dilution protection in the European Union. This
Note concludes that the European Union should revise the
Trademark Directive, defining the phrase likelihood of associa-
tion or deleting the phrase likelihood of association and replac-
ing it with a phrase.that grants all famous trademarks protection
from uses that cause dilution.
I. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE DILUTION DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Since 1282, legislatures and courts have granted trademarks
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is
provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of-trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
24. See id., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (noting that courts should utilize several factors in
determining whether trademark is famous). These factors include:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or 'services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of.the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
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legally recognized protection against infringing uses that cause
confusion as to the source of origin of the trademarked good.25
The United States instituted comprehensive statutory protection
for trademarks in 1946, but again trademarks were only pro-
tected against infringing uses that led to confusion as to the
source of origin of the trademarked good.2 6 In 1995, the United
States passed legislation offering trademarks an additional level
of protection, namely against uses that dilute the distinctive na-
ture of the trademark.21 In 1989, the European Union at-
tempted to harmonize the trademark laws of each Member State
by passing the Trademark Directive. 28 The Trademark Directive,
however, offered trademarks protection from confusion, which
includes a likelihood of association. 29 The Trademark Directive,
furthermore, did not specifically mandate that Member States
must protect trademarks from uses that dilute the distinctiveness
of a trademark. 0
A. General Principles of Trademark Law
The practice of using trademarks as designators of the
source of origin of the good to which they are affixed dates back
25. See Rogers, supra note 3, at 36-37 (discussing law of Parma which afforded
trademarks their first recognized legal protection in 1282). The, law of Parma stated
that guilds would impose a ten pound fine on anyone who infringeda guild members
trademark. by applying the same or similar mark to a steel or iron article not produced
by the mark owner. Id. at 37.
26. See PA-riSHALL, supra note 3, § 5.01, at 171 (discussing how Lanham Act origi-
nally only offered trademark owners legal protection against infringers when consum-
ers were likely to be confused as to source of origin of trademarked product); Chai,
supra note 3, at 373 (stating that Lanham Act initially provided trademark owners with
legal protection against infringing uses that caused confusion).
27. See Lanham Act §§ 43, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125,1127 (as amended by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995) (amending Lanham Act to include protection against
unauthorized uses that dilute trademarks); Hein, supra note 19, at 370 (stating that
United States' Federal Dilution Act of 1995 offers trademark owners protection against
uses that dilute trademark's distinctive nature).
28. See Trademark Directive, supra note 1, O.J. L 40/1, at 1 (1989) (stating that
purpose of Trademark Directive was to approximate Member States' laws).
29. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 1(b) (1989) (stating that trademarks will be pro-
tected against infringing uses when there "exists a likelihood of confusion on the part
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the
trade mark.").
30. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 2 (1989) (stating that Member States may provide
trademarks that have reputations with additional protection against uses on non-similar
goods that take unfair advantage of or are detrimental to character of such trademark).
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into antiquity. 1 As the law surrounding trademarks developed,
legislatures began to offer trademark owners legally recognized
protection against uses of the trademark by others that the legis-
latures deemed to be infringing.3 2 The function of trademarks
has expanded over time, and now trademarks serve as quality
connotaters, 3 embodiments of the trademark owners good
will,34 and advertising agents. 35
1. Development of Trademark Law
A trademark is generally defined as a symbol used by a man-
ufacturer or merchant to identify his or her goods from those
31. See PATrSHALL, supra note 3, § 1.01, at 1 (discussing origins of trademarks and
commercial identification).
32. See I MCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 3-6 (discussing development of trade-
mark law and protection first afforded trademarks by Anglo-American common law).
33. See 1 id. § 3.01(2), at 3 (stating that trademarks function to signify that all
goods sold under trademark are of equivalent level of quality).
34. See 1 id. (describing trademark function as symbol of trademark owner's estab-
lished good will). Good will is an intangible quality which courts have defined the
likelihood "that the old customer will resort to the old place." Dial-A-Mattress Operat-
ing Corp., v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339, 1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting
Crotwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (UK) (1810) (stating that "good will is the value
attributable to a going concern apart from its physical assets - the intangible worth of
buyer momentum emanating from the reputation and integrity earned by the [trade-
mark owner].")); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) (describ-
ing good will as "that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consid-
eration of customers, a-ising from an established and well-known and well-conducted
business."); Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893) (de-
fining good will as
the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in con-
sequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it re-
ceives from constant or habitual customers, on account: of its local position, or
common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from
other accidental circumstances or necessity, or even from ancient prejudices).
Essentially, good will is the expectancy of continued patronage. Boe v. Commissioner,
307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that good will is expectancy of continued
patronage, regardless of reason for it).
35. See Charles W. Grimes & Gregory J. Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising
Properties, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 431, 431-32 (1979) (presenting idea that trademarks serve
as marketing and merchandising tools which advertise trademark owner's goods to con-
sumers and thereby create consumer demand for trademarked good); Jerry B. Swann &
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, an- Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity as Protectable
Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 274 (1994) (recognizing adver-
tising function of trademarks and terming this function as trademark's economic func-
tion); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (recognizing advertising function of trademarks).
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produced or sold by another. 6 As the definition suggests,
manufactorers originally utilized, trademarks solely for the func-
tion of identifying to the consumer the source of origin for a
good.3 7 The U.S. courts clarified the identification aspect of
trademarks, stating that a trademark does not function to inform
the public of the precise location from where a good is pro-
duced." The court noted, instead, that a trademark serves to
communicate to consumers that the good bearing the trade-
mark has emanated from the source from which other goods
bearing that label have always derived.9
The practice of placing a mark on a product to serve as an
indicator of origin dates back to antiquity.4 ° The modern trade-
mark finds its origin in two types of marks that originated with
the guilds4" during the Middle Ages, namely, the proprietary
36. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that trademark consists of "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof- (1) used by a person... to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those man-
ufactured or sold by others."); Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, O.J. L 40/1, at
2 (1989) (stating that trademarks "may consist of any sign capable of being represented
graphically ... provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of another undertaking.").
37. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that trademarks "indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown .... "); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (defining function of trademarks as identifying "the
origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed"); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 3.03, at 11 (discussing original function of trademarks as identification of source of
origin of goods); Schechter, supra note 8, at 814 (discussing that for over four hundred
years trademarks have been affixed on goods for purpose of indicating either origin or
ownership of those goods).
38. See Manhattan Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, Inc., 164 A. 246, (1933),
affd 180 A. 928 (1934) (discussing modified source origination aspect of trademarks
and explaining that trademarks do not inform consumers of actual location of manu-
facture for goods).
39. See id. at 250 (describing function of trademark as representation that good
bearing trademark originates from same place as prior goods bearing that trademark).
40. PATTISHALL, supra note 3, § 1.01, at 1. See Thomas D. Drescher, The Transforma-
tion And Evolution of Trademarks - From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP.
301, 309 (1992) (providing comprehensive examination of trademark evolution and
history). Scholars theorize that the first humans to utilize marks were those that
branded cattle and other animals. Leon E. Daniels, The History of the Trade-Mark, 7
TRADEMARK BULL. 239, 240-41 (1911). Marking of cattle is postulated to have first been
performed during the Stone or Bronze Ages. Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trade-
marks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 128 (1955). Support for this proposition is found in
cave paintings from southwestern Europe, dating from the late Stone Age to the early
Bronze Age, showing cattle that are branded. Id.
41. See Daniels, supra note 40, at 240-41 (discussing medieval work guilds and their
use of marks). The medieval guild was an organization composed of artisans who
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mark42 and the regulatory production mark.4S Once the Gov-
ernment afforded proprietary and regulatory production marks
protection,44 those who infringed either mark, by counterfeiting
in an attempt to deceive consumers, suffered legal sanctions.45
Initially, the primary purpose behind modern trademark
law was to protect a trademark's ability to designate the source of
banded together to protest the usurpation and aggression of the government. Id. at
248. Two types of guilds existed, trade guilds, composed of merchants, and craft guilds,
composed of craftsmen. Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks - Their Early History, 59
TRADEMARK REp. 551, 556 (1969). A Guild member would train at his craft, and upon
becoming a master, he would receive a mark from the guild that only he could affix to
goods. FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS, 103-09 (1925). The guilds mandated that the individual guild member
affix his assigned mark to the good that he produced or sold, thereby, assuring the
guild's control over the trade. Paster, supra, at 556. The primary functions of these
marks were to insure the production of high quality goods and to help enforce territo-
rial trade restrictions. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK RPe. 265, 277 (1975). Furthermore, the guild gave these marks legal pro-
tection, allowing no one to place a mark that was not theirs, a counterfeit mark, on a
good. Id. at 108 (quoting I. C. WELCH, HISTORY OF THE WORSHIPFUL COMPANY OF THE
CUTLERS OF LONDON 287 (1916-23)).
42. See Schechter, supra note 8, at 814 (describing functional aspects of guild pro-
prietary marks during Middle Ages). Proprietary marks did not function to identify
source of origin. Id.- The proprietary mark was affixed to goods by merchants and
served two functions. Id. The merchant affixed a proprietary mark to his or her goods
for the benefit of illiterates or so that the owner, if the goods Were lost due to shipwreck
or piracy, could be identified and the goods returned. Id.
43. See id. (describing guild regulatory marks and discussing functional uses of reg-
ulatory marks). Regulatory production marks functioned to designate the source of
.origin and the producer of a good. Id. According to statute, administrative order, or
municipal or guild regulation, producers were required to affix a regulatory production
mark to their goods. Id. Regulatory production marks served to ensure that producers
created goods of an acceptable quality because the guild would send out wardens or
searchers to test the quality of a member's products. Drescher, supra note 43, at 315.
The mayor would punish any producer who created inferior goods by a fine, imprison-
ment, or expulsion from the guild. Id. The guild members also used the regulatory
production mark to identify foreign goods that were smuggled into the guild's land so
that these goods could be confiscated. Schechter, supra note 8, at 814.
44. See Rogers, supra note 2, at 36-37 (describing law of Parma dated 1282 which
afforded marks legal protection during Middle Ages).
45. See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, Two CHAPTERS ON THE MEDIEVAL GUILDS OF ENG-
LAND 80 (1887) (discussing Middle Age penalties affixed by guilds for infringing an-
other guild members' mark). During the Middle Ages, those the guild found guilty of
infringing anothers' mark were fined, imprisoned, and possibly expelled from the craft.
Id. Under the law of Parma dated 1282, the guild would penalize any artisan who ap-
plied a same or similar mark as another guild member to knives, swords, or other steel
or iron articles in the amount of 10 pounds per offense. Rogers, supra note 2, at 37.
Further, the guild' punished an innkeeper who sold an inferior wine as a high grade
wine by hanging. Ruston, supra note 43, at 140-41.
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origin of a product.46 Courts and legislatures originally offered
legal protection to trademark owners against infringers who
used identical or similar trademarks on similar or competing
goods.47 The legislatures legal protection, however, was afforded
only to the extent that a consumer was likely to be confused.48
46. StephanJ. Feder, Trademark - § 368-d Dilution Relief in New York - Abandoning
the Confusion/Competition Requirement, 46 FoRDRAM L. Rjv., 1315, 1323 (1978); see Lan-
ham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that trademarks are used to indicate source of
goods); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.03, at 11-13 (discussing nature of trademarks as
indicator of source of origin); Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 482 (stating that origi-
nal use of trademarks was to identify source of product).
47. See PA-rISHALL, supra note 3, § 5.01, at 171 (discussing protection originally
offered trademark owners by U.S. trademark statutes against infringement). Originally,
in order for an unauthorized use of a trademark to constitute infringement, the unau-
thorized user must use a trademark that is confusingly similar to that of the trademark
owners and the trademark must be used on goods that have similar properties to the
goods sold by the trademark owner. Id.
48. See Lanham Act §§ 2 (d) 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (discussing trademark protection
against confusion afforded by United States). The Lanham Act states that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive .. .shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies .. .provided.
Id. at (1) (a) (b). The Trademark Directive states that any merchant who owns a regis-
tered trademark shall be protected against all unauthorized uses in the course of trade
where there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Trademark Di-
rective, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b), O.J. L 40/1 (1989). Trademark law was initially de-
veloped "not to 'protect' trademarks, but ... to protect the consuming public from
confusion, concomitantly protecting the trademark owner's right to a non-confused
public." James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976); see also 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 2.06, 2.12, at 30-67 (explaining that trade-
mark owner's rights only involve right to prevent confusion). To prove infringement, a
trademark owner does not have to establish that the unauthorized use of a same or
similar trademark causes actual confusion of the public, but only that there exists a
likelihood that the public will be confused by the unauthorized use of a same or similar
trademark. 3 Id. § 23.02(1), at 30-32. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that: "'under the
Lanham Act, the ultimate test [for trademark infringement] is whether the public is
likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of marks .... Whether we call the
violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of origin, the test is
identical - is there a "likelihood of confusion?"'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting New West Corp. v.
NYM Co. of California Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (1979)), U.S. courts have enumerated
numerous factors to be used in the determination of whether a likelihood of confusion
exists between trademarks uses between non-identical goods or services. PA-rISHALL,
supra note 3, § 6.02, at 234. The first U.S. court to set out such factors for testing
whether a likelihood of confusion exists was the Second Circuit. See Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (establishing factors to be used in
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Legal scholars argue that over time the functions of a trademark
have expanded and that currently trademarks function as desig-
nators of source of origin, guarantors of the quality of the trade-
marked goods,49 embodiments of the trademark owner's good
will,5" and advertising entities. 1 To amply protect these new
functions, legislatures have begun to expand trademark protec-
tion, and now protect trademarks from uses that dilute a trade-
determining whether likelihood of confusion exists between two trademarks). In Polar-
oid v. Polarad, the Second Circuit stated that in determining if a likelihood of confusion
exists, courts should examine, among other factors,
the strength of [the plaintiffs] mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith
in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant product, and the sophisti-
cation of the buyers.
Id. Although U.S. courts first expressed these Polaroid factors to assess the likelihood of
confusion between non-identical goods, U.S. courts now utilize the factors in all likeli-
hood of confusion cases, including cases involving identical goods. JANE C. GINSBURG,
ET AL. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw 429 (2d ed. 1996). See, eg., Vitarroz
Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1981) (utilizing Polaroid factors in deter-
mining whether likelihood of confusion existed between similar goods). All U.S. circuit
courts have adopted factors, similar to those enumerated by the Second Circuit in Polar-
oid v. Polarad, for determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. Boston Athletic
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor
Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 (1991); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206
(1992); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisermann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir.
1986); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100,
1106 (6th Cir. 1991); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1185
(7th Cir. 1989); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); E. &J.
Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992); Beer Nuts, Inc. v.
Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986); Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton,
743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (lth Cir. 1984).
49. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 14-16.1 (discussing how trademarks
function as signs that all similarly trademarked goods are of equivalent level of quality).
50. See 1 id. § 3.01 (2), at 3 (stating that in addition to other functions, trademarks
also symbolize good will that trademark owner has established for trademark).
51. See 1 id. § 3.05, at 20-21 (noting that trademark serves as prime element in
advertising and that trademarks function to give consumers information as to what
products are available); Hartman, supra note 6, at 509 (stating that trademarks have
advertising function which refers to capacity of trademark to attract customers and sell
goods); Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 484 (noting that trademarks function in adver-
tising and product promotion); Grimes & Battersby, supra note 38, at 431 (discussing
possibility that trademarks function as marketing tools whereby trademark owners ad-
vertise their trademark owner's goods to consumers); Swann & Davis, Jr., supra note 38,
at 274 (recognizing advertising function of trademarks and terming this function as
trademark's economic function); Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205 (recognizing advertising
function of trademarks).
874 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:861
mark, as well as from confusion.52
2. Functions of a Trademark
Trademarks originally functioned to designate the source of
origin of a product.53 Trademarks over time started to connote
the quality of the product to which they were affixed 4.5  Trade-
marks also began to embody and symbolize the good will that a
trademark owner has established for the trademarked product.
55
Trademarks additionally have developed an advertising func-
tion. 56
a. Designation of Source of Origin
The designation of origin function of a trademark benefits
consumers by reducing the search costs57 that a consumer must
spend in finding a desired good. 58 The source of origin func-
52. See Lanham Act §§ 43, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (as amended by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995) (offering trademarks protection against unauthorized
uses that cause dilution of trademark even when -likelihood of confusion is not pres-
ent); Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5, O.J. L 40/1 at 4 2 (1989) (affording
trademarks, that have reputation, protection against uses that damage this reputation
regardless of whether likelihood of confusion is present).
53. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating that trademarks are used to
indicate source of goods); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.03, at 11-13 (discussing na-
ture of trademarks as indicator of source of origin); Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at
482 (discussing original use of trademarks as identifiers of source of product).
54. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 14-20 (examining how trademarks act
to signify that all similarly trademarked goods will be produced at equivalent level of
quality).
55. See 1 id. § 2.08, at 38-44 (describing trademark's function as symbol of good
will that trademark ownei has established for trademark); PATrISHALL, supra note 3,
§ 8.05, at 407 (stating that advertising motifs and characters, which are trademarks,
"have become important mechanisms by which businesses both generate and symbolize
good will.").
56. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.05, at 20-21 (describing how trademarks
function as advertising entities); Hartman, supra note 6, at 509 (discussing how trade-
marks function as advertising entities which have the capacity to attract customers and
sell goods); Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 484 (stating that trademarks function in
advertising and product promotion); Grimes & Battersby, supra note 35, at 431 (exam-
ining whether trademarks function as merchandising tools whereby trademark owners
advertise their trademark owner's goods to consumers).
57. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.01(2) (b), at 7-10 (stating that trademarks
reduce consumer search costs because they allow consumers to remember names of
products they prefer, thereby preventing customers from incurring needless expenses
looking for products).
58. See I id. (asserting that trademarks promote marketplace efficiency by reduc-
ing search costs in consumer purchasing decisions); Scadia Diwn Corp. v. Euroquilt,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that trademarks function to reduce
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tion also benefits the trademark owner because it provides a
method that guarantees the consuming public will recognize the
trademarked good.59 If trademarks did not exist, a consumer,
who wanted what is trademarked as Coke, would have to expend
energy searching and asking for that tasty, syrupy, dark colored,
carbonated beverage produced by Coca-Cola Company.60 Hav-
ing to ask for Coke in this fashion would take longer to say, re-
quire the consumer to remember more, and require the server
or merchant to recognize that what the consumer asked for was
the brown beverage Coke which is produced by the Coca-Cola
Company.61 Furthermore, the problem is amplified because the
Coca-Cola Company produces several beverages that are dark,
tasty, and syrupy.6 2
b. Quality Connotation
Trademarks also benefit the consumer by reflecting the
quality of the good to be purchased.6" By reflecting quality,
trademarks allow consumers to maintain an expectation that the
trademarked goods that they buy will have the same quality level
as those they previously purchased.64 This quality connoting
costs consumers incur in searching for desired products); New Kids on the Block v. New
America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[i]n economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by in-
forming people that trademarked products come from the same source."). Landes &
Posner analogize the benefits a consumer receives due to trademarks to that of the
benefits of designating people with first and last names. William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987).
Landes and Posner suggest that while trademarks reduce the costs of searching for a
particular good, first and last names reduce the costs of searching for a particular per-
son. Id. Instead of having to ask for the decaffeinated coffee made by General Mills,
consumers reduce their search costs by asking for a "Sanka". Id. Similarly, people do
not have to ask for Frank the professor from Harvard who originated the theory of
dilution, rather they can ask for Frank Schechter. Id.
59. Jill Sarnoff, Riola, Practical Strategies for Global Trademark Licensing, 7 No. 10 J.
PROPMETARY RTS. 11, 11 (1995).
60. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 270.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See H.R. REP No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945) (statement of Rep. Lan-
ham) (stating that "[tirade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to
the producer the benefit of the good reputation excellence creates."); Hanson & Walls,
supra note 6, at 483-84 (describing quality assurances trademarks convey to consumers);
1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.01(2) (a) at 4-7 (discussing how trademarks function to
encourage production of quality products).
64. See Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. 205, 208 (N.D. Ga.
1967) (stating that trademarks offer assurance to consumers that goods affixed with
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function of a trademark further acts as a form of guarantee or
warranty that the purchaser will receive the same degree of satis-
faction from the trademarked good as they have from prior
purchases of similarly trademarked goods.6"
c. Embodiment of Good Will
Trademarks symbolize the good will that a trademark owner
has established for the trademarked prOduct. 66 Good will essen-
tially is the value of the name and symbol recognition that is
created in the trademark as a result of the trademark owners
use, advertising, and sales.67 The good will aspect of a trademark
benefits the trademark owner by allowing consumer reliance on
the trademarks reputation, its quality connotation, in making
their purchases.6" Good will, additionally, generates buyer mo-
mentum, encouraging a purchaser to return to, and purchase
again, a good with which the purchaser is familar.69
trademark will have same quality level as those goods previously purchased); Patricia
Kimball Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of a Trademark
System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 297, 317 (1982) (discussing fact that quality function of
trademarks guarantees consistency, not highest possible quality).
65. See Revlon, Inc. v. La Muir, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. 602, 605 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (stating
that consumers receive warranty that goods bearing trademark will have similar quality
to other goods bearing that trademark); Hanson & Wells, supra note 6, at 483-84 (dis-
cussing trademark's ability to guarantee quality of product to consumer); see also
Schechter, supra note 8, at 818-19 (stating that trademarks imprint "upon the public
mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for fur-
ther satisfactions").
66. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.07, at 34 (stating trademarks function as
symbol of trademark owner's good will); Sheldon H. Klein, Introduction to Trademarks, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 1996, at 57, 60 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3975, 1996) (stating trade-
marks symbolize and protect good will which company has established for trademarked
product); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that trademarks
are merely symbol by which public recognizes trademark owner's reputation and, there-
fore, trademarks have no independent significance apart from -owner's good will)..
67. See SEIGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 8, 11 (2d ed.
1991) (defining good will as value of trademark that accrues from use, advertising, and
sales which involve trademark); Dial-A-Mattress, 841 F. Supp. at 1350 (defining good will
as intangible worth, which results from trademark's reputation, that moves consumers
towards purchasing trademarked product).
68. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(discussing function of good will in relation to domestic commerce); American Cyana-
mid Corp. v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing how
trademark owners are encouraged to produce goods of reliable quality since that will
create good will).
69. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.08(2), at 40-41 (describing how good will
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d. Advertising Function
In regards to advertising, Frank Schechter described trade-
marks as the most effective vehicle available by which companies
can establish product acceptance and encourage consumer loy-
alty.7° Trademarks serve as advertising agents because, similar to
advertisements, trademarks convey information and persuade
consumers to purchase the trademarked good.7" The advertis-
ing function \of a trademark benefits the trademark owner by al-
lowing the creation and maintenance of consumer demand for a
product.72
B. Trademark Law and Policy in the United States and the European
Union
In the United States, trademark law is governed by the Lan-
ham Act which took effect on July 5, 1947.73 In addition to the
Lanham Act, U.S. trademark laws and court rulings are influ-
acts to lure purchasers into purchasing trademarked goods that they have purchased in
the past).
70. Schechter, supra note 8, at 819.
71. TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION 73 (1996). Trademarks convey informa-
tion directly by way of the natural meaning behind the trademark. Id. Generally only
descriptive words convey information directly based on the inherent definitions of the
trademark. Id. at 77. For example, if George Eastman had named his camera company
Camera, instead of Kodak he would have directly conveyed information concerning the
product. Id. Trademarks indirectly convey information by virtue of.the mental associa-
tions that consumers create between the trademarked good and the knowledge they
possess as to how the trademark has been utilized. Id. at 73. For example, generally,
the consuming public has now learned to associate Kodak with cameras because of
information they have gained through either through word of mouth, disseminated
information, or direct experience. Id. at 77.
72. See Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 485-86 (stating that trademarks serve func-
tion of creating and retaining consumer demand for particular product). One United
States Court of Appeals described a trademark's purpose as being to affix the product
and the producer in the minds of those consumers who see the trademark so that after-
wards the consumer will themselves be influenced by this knowledge or they will convey
it to others who are seeking the type of good for which the trademark is affixed.
Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 774 (7th Cir. 1927).
73. See 4A RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES, § 25.01, at 5 (4th ed. & Supp. 1997) (noting that Lanham Act, effective
July 5, 1957, is present U.S. trademark law and that Lanham Act was intended to com-
bine previous Trademark Act with numerous amendments). Callmann states that addi-
tional purposes of the Lanham Act were "to eliminate confusion created by conflicting
interpretations, to simplify and liberalize registration and make it more meaningful, to
dispense with overly technical prohibitions, and to provide prompt and effective relief
against infringement." 4A Id.
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enced by the policies which underlie trademark law.74 Individ-
ual Member States of the European Union each have their own
trademark laws, however, all Member States were required to im-
plement the Trademark Directive into their trademark laws.7 5
1. U.S. Trademark Law & Policy
The U.S. Congress afforded trademarks their first. recog-
nized statutory protection in 1870.76 Congress amended this
statute in 1876,77 but in 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the trademark statute was unconstitutional. 7 After enacting sev-
eral other trademark statutes, Congress finally enacted a com-
prehensive trademark statute, the Trademark Act of 1946, com-
monly referred to as the Lanham Act. 79 When examining trade-
mark matters, U.S. Courts and legislatures are influenced by
policy considerations as well as the Lanham Act.80
a. Initial Attempts at Trademark Legislation
The United States originally based its trademark laws on the
English common law governing trademark protection.8 ' Con-
74. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946) (stating that preventing
public from confusion, maintaining competition, and protecting trademark owners'
good will are policies underlying enactment of Lanham Act); 4B CALLMANN, supra note
73, § 25.01, at 5 (discussing objectives of Lanham Act as securing good will, protecting
consumers from false and deceptively trademarked goods, and broadening rights of
trademark owner's); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.01(1), at 3 (noting that policies
underlying trademark law are "consumer protection, property rights, economic ef-
ficency and universal concepts of justice ... ."). McCarthy states that in a trademark
case, the policies are sometimes in conflict and courts must weigh each policy in reach-
ing their determination. 1 Id.
75. See Trademark Directive, supra note 1, O.J. L 40/1, at 1 (1989) (discussing how
Trademark Directive was not enacted to provide full scale harmonization of Member
States' trademark laws). The Trademnark Directive required all Mmeber States to in-
corporate the Trademark Directive's changes into the Mmeber States' trademark laws
byJanuary 1, 1993. Id. art. 16, O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989).
76. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12.
77. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 141.
78. See United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding trademark stat-
utes of 1870 and 1876 unconstitutional due to Congress' basing these statutes on wrong
section of U.S. Constitution).
79. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (Lanham Act §§ 1-51 (1996)).
80. See S. REp. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946) (stating that preventing
public from confusion, maintaining competition, and protecting trademark owners'
good will are policies underlying enactment of Lanham Act).
81. See PATrISHALL, supra note 3, § 1.01, at 2 (stating that U.S. adopted English
common law relating to trademarks).
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gress enacted the first trademark law in 187082 and amended it
in 1876,83 but the Supreme Court declared these statutes uncon-
stitutional.84 The Supreme Court declared the initial trademark
statutes unconstitutional because Congress improperly based the
statutes on the patent and trademark clause,8" and not the com-
merce clause,86 of the U.S. Constitution. 7 In 1881 and 1905,
Congress passed other statutes protecting trademarks.88 Finally,
in 1946, Congress passed the most recent federal trademark leg-
islation that addresses trademark law, the Lanham Act.89
b. The Lanham Act
Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a federally recognized
trademark as any word, name, symbol, or device used by a per-
son to identify their goods and to indicate the source of origin of
the goods.9 ° The Lanham Act initially did not protect against
82. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12.
83. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 141.
84. See Steffens, 100 U.S. at 94 (holding trademark statutes of 1870 and 1876 uncon-
stitutional due to Congress' basing these statutes on wrong section of U.S. Constitu-
tion). In Steffens, the Supreme Court found the 1870 and 1876 trademark statutes un-
constitutional. Id. The Supreme Court stated that because Congress included the
trademark laws in the Act entitled "An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the stat-
utes relating to Patents and Copyrights," Congress improperly relied on Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 8, the patent and copyright clause, of the Constitution for the power to
regulate trademarks. Id. The Court- stated that it would leave undecided the issue of
whether Congress could rely on the commerce clause of the Constitution to enact
trademark laws because that issue was not currently in front of the court. Id. 95-96.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8 (governing patents and trademarks). Clause 8
of section 1 grants Congress the power "[tio promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (governing commerce). Clause 3 of section 8
states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
87. See Steffens, 100 U.S.'at 93-98 (discussing Congress' attempt to rely on Constitu-
tion's patent and copyright clause for power to regulate trademark uses); PA'rISHALL,
supra note 3, § 1.01, at 3. Congress incorrectly utilized the patent and copyright clause
of the U.S. Constitution in order to support its enactment of the U.S. trademark acts of
1870 and 1876. Id. The proper constitutional support for U.S. trademark laws enacted
by Congress is the commerce clause. Id.
88. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502; Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat.
724 (1905), amended ly Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 553.
89. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (Lanham Act §§ 1-51 (1996)).
90. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. According to Section 45 of the Lanham
Act, a trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof...
used by a person . .. to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
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unauthorized uses of a trademark unless the trademark's use
caused confusion to consumers as to the source of origin of a
good.9 ' In 1995, Congress, by amendment, added a dilution
provision to the Lanham Act thereby offering trademark owners
protection against unauthorized uses that dilute their trade-
mark, regardless of the absence of confusion.92
c. Policy Considerations
In the United States, policy considerations, as well as the
Lanham Act, influence the protection that courts and legisla-
tures afford trademarks.9" The two primary policies that Con-
gress has stated underlie U.S. trademark law are the protection
of good will94 and the prevention of public confusion. 5 In re-
cent years, legal scholars have theorized of a third policy behind
trademark law, namely, the protection of competition.96
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown." Id., 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
91. See PArrIsHaAL, supra note 3, § 5.01, at 171 (stating that trademark owners orig-
inally could only bring Lanham Act infringement suits when consumers were likely to
be confused as to source of origin of trademarked product).
92. See Lanham Act §§ 43, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (as amended by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995) (amending Lanham Act to include protection against
unauthorized uses that dilute trademarks).
93. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946) (stating that preventing
public from confusion, maintaining competition, and protecting trademark owners'
good will are policies underlying enactment of Lanham Act). The basis behind afford-
ing trademarks protection "is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competi-
tion, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good
will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have
not." Id. The Supreme Court has stated that the redress which a trademark owner is
afforded due to infringement is based upon the trademark owner's right to have their
good will protected. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-14 (1916).
The Supreme Court recognized the policies Congress utilized in drafting the Lanham
Act, stating that the U.S. trademark law affords trademark owners "national protection
of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers."
Park N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
94. See S. REP. No. 1333 (protecting trademarks prevents taking of owner's reputa-
tion and good will by others); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 2.07-2.08, at 34-45 (discuss-
ing how trademark law protects good will of businesses); National Color Labs., Inc. v.
Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that trademark own-
ers have interest in protecting their reputation and good will).
95. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.01, 2 (stating that trademark law protects
interests of public in not being deceived); Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d
745, 748 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (noting that essence of trademark law is prevention of
public confusion).
96. See Professor Hugh Hansen, Trademark Law Lecture at Fordham University
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i. Protection of a Trademark Owner's Good Will
The effort that a trademark owner adds to the trademark
through advertising and production of quality products creates
good will,9 7 which the public associates with the trademark.98
Free riders99 may attempt to gain an advantage from another's
trademark without paying anything for this advantage.100 The
good will policy originated in John Locke's theory of property
rights 0 1 where a creator or owner who expends energy, time,
money, and effort to develop a piece of property, such as a trade-
mark, is granted protection from others taking it.10 2 By punish-
School of Law (Fall 1996) (stating that competition policy drives U.S. trademark law);
but see I MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.01, at 2 (asserting that trademark law encourages
competition, but not claiming, that competition policy drives trademark law).
97. See 1 id., §§ 2.07-2.08, at 34-45 (discussing good will and defining good will as
"a business value that reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business
with a seller who has offered goods and services that the customer likes and has found
adequate to fulfill his needs.").
98. See H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) (stating that trademarks
protect trademark owners' energy, time, and money spent presenting product to con-
sumers); Schechter, supra note 8, at 818-19 (stating that trademark is efficient method
of creating good will). Trademarks do not merely symbolize good will, but often they
are "the most effective agent for the creation of good will." Id. at 818.
99. See Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights In Gross, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 19, 21 n.9 (1995) (defining free rider as "one who appropriates the efforts that
another has exerted in trying to establish his reputation in the market place."). Free-
riders utilize a mark, similar to one used by a competitor, on either similar or differing
goods in the hopes that the public will associate them with the successful mark, thereby
boosting their sales. See Landes and Posner, supra note 61, at 270.
100. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that competitors realize economic advantage of entering established
market and free-riding on competitor's advertising and trademark by selling similar
product with similar trademark). The free-rider attempts "to tread closely on the heels
of [a] very successful trademark" in an attempt to become associated with the estab-
lished trademark so that the sale of the free-rider's goods will increase without having to
build up their own good will. Id. At almost no cost, the free-riding competitor is able
to capture some of the good will associated with the original trademark because some
consumers will mistakenly believe that the free-rider's brand and the original trade-
mark owner's brand are the same. See Landes & Posner, supra note 61, at 272 (stating
that "[t]he free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture some of the profits associ-
ated with a strong trademark because some consumers will assume (at least for some
time) that the free rider's brand and the original trademark holder's brand are identi-
cal.").
101. See JEssE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 16 (3d ed. 1993) (stating
that John Locke's labor theory grants property rights to individuals bodies and that
when individuals add part of their body to objects through labor they gain rights to
ownership in object because they own labor that was added) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SEC-
OND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5 (1690)).
102. Id.
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ing infringers through the Lanham Act, Congress has discour-
aged free riding, thereby, incorporating the good will policy into
U.S. trademark law.103
ii. Prevention of Public Confusion
The second policy underlying U.S. trademark law, the pol-
icy of preventing public confusion, ensures that consumers will
recognize the source of origin of a product. 10 4 According to this
policy, the public should be able to rely on a trademark when
purchasing goods or services. 10 5 Without this type of protection,
search costs would increase because consumers would confuse
goods or services and would not always know where the goods
were produced.106
iii. Protection of Interbrand Competition
Interbrand competition is the term of art used to describe
two competing goods which are similar yet are produced by two
different companies. 10 7  The policy of protecting interbrand
competition is a policy that courts and legislatures use to balance
103. See Park N'Fly, 469 U.S. at/198 (discussing policies underlying U.S. trademark
law); Union Nat'l. Bank of Texas, Laredo, Texas v. Union Nat'l. Bank of Texas, Austin,
Texas, 909 F.2d 839, 843-844 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that principle concerns underly-
ing trademark law are protection of consumers from confusion and protecting trade-
mark owner's good will from free-riders).
104. Kenneth B. Germain, The Thirty-Ffith Year of Administration of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946: Part III. Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition Litigation in the
Courts of General Jurisdiction, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 559, 559 (1982) (stating that public
policy behind trademark law is to prevent confusion and deceit as to good's source of
origin).
105. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
918 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that one purpose of Lanham Act is to protect consumers
from confusion as to origin of goods); Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and
Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 48, 65
(1997) (stating that policy of preventing consumer confusion which would lead to
purchase of undesired goods is heart of trademark law).
106. See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc. 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that "[c] onfusingly similar marks make consumer's task in searching for prod-
ucts harder."); Theresa A. Charters, Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.:
Confusinf "Play" on Words Costs "Dough"for Rose Art, 25 U. TOL. L. Rv. 271, 277 (1994)
(discussing Euroquilt and stating that court in Euroquilt reasoned that confusion be-
tween similar trademarks increases consumer search costs); Peter E. Mims, Promotional
Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REv. 639,
669 n.103 (1984) (stating that confusion between trademarks increases consumer
search costs, thereby, increasing product's actual cost).
107. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52 n'19 (1977) (defining inter-
brand competition as competition among manufacturers of same generic product).
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the interests of providing protection for trademarks and prevent-
ing trademark owners from acquiring a monopoly.1"8 This pol-
icy fosters competition by preventing a trademark owner from
receiving protection for anything that others need to compete
effectively, thereby, precluding a trademark owner from estab-
lishing a monopoly that would exclude others from effectively
competing in the market-place.10 9
2. European Union Trademark Law
The European Union emerged from the European Eco-
nomic Community ("EEC") which was formed in order to create
a unified economic Europe. 110 In 1989, the European Commis-
sion'11 ("Commission") enacted the Trademark Directive which
108. See Carrie Weinfeld, Carrie@ONULREV ONU.EDU.: Internet Domain Names and
Trademark Infringement, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 229, 240 (1996) (stating that Lanham Act
does not protect trademarks which are so essential to way good operates, thereby,
preventing trademark owner from gaining monopoly over product itself, nor does Lan-
ham Act "protect trademarks that so affect a product's cost or quality that the owner's
exclusive use would unfairly hinder competition."); Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's
Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (finding that California
statute should be narrowly interpreted so as not to provide broad trademark protection,
thereby, preventing any damage to competition); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 301 (1988) (stating that "trademarks do not confer on the [trademark] owner
property interests or monopoly power over intrabrand competition. . . ."); Sunbeam
Lighting Co. V. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969, 973 (1950) (stating that trademark own-
ers, even with reputations, cannot have legally enforceable monopoly over trademarked
term).
109. See Ronald L. Panitch, Product Simulation and Protection of Industrial Designs,
C848 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
FOR THE GENERAL PRACrITIONER 363, 365-66 (1993) (stating that functionality doctrine
encourages competition by preventing one manufacturer from acquiring monopoly by
attempting to trademark product's design features which are essential to success of
every similar product of that type); Union Nat'l Bank, Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank,
Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that two principle concerns of
trademark law, namely preventing confusion and protecting investment in trademarks,
promote competition).
110. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987).
111. See EC Treaty, supra note 110, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682 (empowering
Commission to enforce EU policy and introduce EU legislative proposals).
[T] he Commission is chiefly a decision-making body whose main powers lie in
1998]
884 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:861
was intended to harmonize the legal protection Member States
afford trademarks. 1 2 The Trademark Directive states that Mem-
ber States must afford trademarks protection from infringing
uses that cause a likelihhod of confusion directly or through a
likeliood of association. 1 Additionally, the Trademark Direc-
tive stated that Member States may provide trademarks protec-
tion against infringing uses that take unfair advantage of, or are
detrimental to, the distinctive character of the trademark.114
These provisions appear to afford trademarks protection for uses
that cause dilution, however, the UK Chancory Division held
that the Trademark Directive did not offer trademarks protec-
tion against infringement unless there was a showing of a likeli-
hood ,of confusion. 1 5
a. European Union Institutions Relating to Trademarks
In 1951, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands organized the European Coal and Steel
Community" 6 ("ECSC") to regulate production and to promote
the field of initiating, implementing, and enforcing legislation, while the ac-
tual decision-making is primarily carried out by the Council.
A.G. TOTH, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 70 (1990).
112. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, O.J. L 40/1 (1989).
113. Id., art. 5, Oj. L 40/1, at 1(b) (1989). The relevant part of Article 5 reads
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not hav-
ing his consent from using in the course of trade:
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade
mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the
trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the
sign and the trade mark.
114. Id., art. 5 O.J. L 40/1, at 2 (1989). Article 5 paragraph 2 states in relevant
part that
2. [a]ny Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled
to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of
trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation
to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where
use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental
to, the distinctive character or of the repute of the trade mark.
115. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 730 (stating that phrase likelihood of associa-
tion, found in section 10(2) of 1994 Trade Marks Act, did not extend trademark protec-
tion to uses that do not result in confusion as to product origin); Baywatch, [1997]
F.S.R. at 30 (stating that 1994 Trade Marks Act, section 10(3), does not offer trade-
marks protection without finding of likelihood of confusion).
116. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
1998] PROTECTING BAYWATCH AND WA GAMA MA 885
free trade in the coal and steel industries.11 The ECSC
prompted the six ECSC members to sign the Treaty of Rome,11
an agreement establishing criteria for political and economic in-
tegration.11 The Treaty of Rome established the EEC.120 In or-
der to further the idea of a unified economic Europe, the mem-
bers of the EEC, known as Member States, agreed to relinquish
national sovereignty in areas covered by the Treaty of Rome.121
The Treaty of Rome also established the Commission, the Coun-
cil of Ministers122 ("Council"), and the European Court of Jus-
tice ("ECJ"). 123 From 1978 until 1993, the ECSC and the EEC,
combined with the European Atomic Energy Community were
collectively referred to as the European Community.1 24 In 1993,
the Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union, replaced
the term European Economic Community with European
Union.1 25 Today, the European Union is composed of Austria,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987).
117. See id. art. 2, 261 U.N.T.S. at 145 (stating that Member States will utilize crea-
tion of common market in order to maintain optimum coal and steel production); id.
art. 4(a), 261 U.N.T.S. at 147 (discussing restrictions on movement of coal and steel).
118. See EEC Treaty, supra note 15, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit T.S. No.1 (set-
ting forth term "Treaty of Rome").
119. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(EC Oll Pub. Off. 1987).
120. Id.
121. EC Treaty, supra note 110, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
122. See id., art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80 (establishing Council of Ministers
and describing Council of Minister's functions). In order to obtain the Treaty of
Rome's objectives, the Council of Ministers shall:
ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States;
have the power to take decisions;
confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for
the implementation of.the rules which the Council lays down.
Id.
123. See id., arts. 164-87, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91 (providing that European
Court of Justice will act as judicial branch of European Union).
124. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 549 (2d ed.
1995).
125. TEU, supra note 110, art. G., OJ. C 224/1, at 5 [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728; see
CARTER, supra note 124, at 549 (noting that Maastricht Treaty replaced European Com-
munity with European Union).
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Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 126
i. The European Commission
The Commission acts as the executive body of the European
Union. 127 In this position, the Commission ensures that Mem-
ber States introduce and enforce EC legislation in compliance
with the EC Treaty.121 In order to assure that Member States are
enacting the EU legislation, the Commission is empowered by
the EC Treaty to bring an action before the ECJ if it contends
that a Member State has not properly implemented an EC
Treaty requirement. 129
ii. The Council of Ministers
The Council is composed of representatives from' each
Member State,13° and is the acting legislative body of the Euro-
pean Union."' The Council is responsible for harmonizing na-
126. Id.; see TEU, supra note 110, pmbl., OJ. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 725- 26 (noting that until 1995, twelve EU Member States were Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, and United Kingdom).
127. See EC Treaty, supra note 110, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682 (providing
Commission with powers typically bestowed upon executive branch of government).
Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome provides that the Commission will function to:
ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institu-
tions pursuant thereto are applied;
formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission consider it necessary;
exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of
the rules laid down by the latter.
Id.
128. Id.; see TOTH, supra note 111, at 70 (detailing role of Commission in legisla-
tion proposals and enforcement).
129. See EC Treaty, supra note 110, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686 (stating that
European Commission can bring legal action against Member State in front of ECJ if
Commission has reason to conclude that Member State is not fulfilling obligations
under EC Treaty).
130. See id. art. 146, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680 (stating that "[t]he Council shall
consist of a representative of each Member State at a ministerial level, authorized to
commit the government of that Member State.").
131. See id. art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80 (discussing Council's ability to act
as legislature).
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tional laws that affect the common market.1 12 The Council ac-
complishes this harmonization of the laws of Member States by
issuing directives1 3 that require Member States to revise their
laws according to guidelines specified in the directive.1
3 4
iii. The European Court of Justice
The ECJ is the judicial branch of the European Union. 135
The ECJ is comprised of fifteen Judges, 131 one from each Mem-
ber State, and nine Advocates-General. 137 The EC Treaty grants
the ECJ jurisdiction'to decide matters wherein an action by a
Member State may be proscribed by the EC Treaty.
3 8
b. 1989 European Union Trademark Directive
By adopting the Trademark Directive, the Commission at-
tempted to harmonize the protection each Member State affords
trademarks. 139 Prior to the Trademark Directive, each Member
State had its own trademark laws and many Member States pro-
vided different protection for trademarks. 1" ° With the adoption
of the Trademark Directive, the Council partially aligned the
Member States' policies on the protection Member States should
grant trademarks. 4'
132. See id. (discussing Council's function of coordinating Member State's eco-
nomic policies).
133. Id. art. 100, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633. "The Council shall ... issue directives
for the approximation of such laws,' regulations or administrative provisions of the
Member States as directly affect the establishment of the common market." Id.
134. See TEU, supra note 110, art. 189, O.J. C 224/1, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 693-94 (describing how Council directives are to be implemented by Mem-
ber States). A directive does not set out precise policies that a Member State must
comply with, instead "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved,
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national author-
ities the choice of form and methods." Id.
135. See EC Treaty, supra note 110, arts. 164-87, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91
(describing composition and jurisdiction of ECJ).
136. Id. art. 165, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
137. Id. art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
138. See id. arts. 169, 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87 (stating that ECJ hasjurisdic-
tion over matters when Commission or Member State takes action due to Member
State's failure to fulfill Treaty requirements).
139. Id.
140. See id., OJ. L 40/1, at 1 (1989) (stating that current Member States' trade-
mark laws are not uniform and contain disparities).
141. Id. The Trademark Directive states that it was not designed to bring a full
scale approximation, instead it was designed to only harmonize those "national provi-
sions of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal market." Id.
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The Trademark Directive's purpose was to eliminate dispari-
ties between Member State trademark laws that inhibited the
free movement of goods and distorted competition within the
European Union. 4 2  The Commission required all Member
States to incorporate the Trademark Directive's changes into
their trademark laws by January 1, 1993,143 however, according
to the harmonization principle of the Trademark Directive, the
Member States' existing trademark rights would continue to ex-
ist. 14 4 Member States, therefore, still retain the ability to estab-
lish various areas of trademark law, including differing protec-
tions for trademarks and the ability to interpret the Trademark
Directive differently.145
The Trademark Directive does not provide a statutory defi-
nition for a trademark, but the Trademark Directive states that a
merchant may register as a trademark anything that is capable of
graphical representation and that will serve to distinguish the
merchant's goods from another merchant's goods. 146  The
Trademark Directive also establishes certain rights for trademark
holders.147 Article 5 paragraph 1 (b) of the Trademark Directive
provides trademark owners with protection against uses by
others that causes a likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public, including a likelihood of confusion directly or through
142. See id. (stating that present trademark laws of Member States "contain dispari-
ties which may impede the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services
and may distort competition within the common market.").
143. Id. art. 16, OJ. L 40/1, at 7 12 (1989).
144. See id., OJ. L 40/1, at 1 (1989) (stating that presently it is not necessary to
undertake full-scale approximation of Member States' trademark laws). Specifically,
the Trademark Directive does not attempt to harmonize a Member State's rights as to
protecting trademarks acquired through use, establishing the protocol for registering,
revoking, and invalidating trademarks, applying principles of other areas of law, such as
unfair competition or civil liability, to trademarks, providing rules as to how trademarks
may be assigned or transferred. Id., O.J. L 40/1, at 1-2 (1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. art. 2, OJ. L 40/1 (1989).
A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically,
particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the
shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.
Id.
147. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 40/1 (1989) (describing trademark rights conferred to trade-
mark owner under Trademark Directive).
1998] PROTECTING BAYWATCH AMD WA GA MA MA
association. 48 Following the Benelux countries, the Council in-
cluded the phrasing confusion due to association in the Trade-
mark Directive. 49 Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Trademark Di-
rective states that a Member State may also provide protection
for an owner of a trademark which possess a reputation in the
Member State from uses that take unfair advantage of, or are
detrimental of the distinctive character of the trademark.
1 50
C. The Dilution Doctrine of Trademark Law
The dilution doctrine, whereby a trademark is damaged and
losses its distinctiveness when it is used on a non-competing
good, was created in Germany in 1924.151 Frank I. Schechter
148. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 1(b) (1989). Article 5 paragraph 1(b) reads in
relevant part,
1. [t]he registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not hav-
ing his consent from using in the course of trade:
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade
mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the
trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part
of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the
sign and the trade mark.
Id.
149. See Paul Harris, UK Trade Mark Law: Are You Confused?, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 601, 601 (1995) (stating that delegates from Benelux nations "sought to have the
risk of association concept incorporated in... the Directive."). The Benelux countries
experienced considerable difficulties in persuading the European Commission and
other European nations' delegates to accept the inclusion of the concept of risk of
association. Id. Finally, a compromise was reached, and the European Commission
included the phrase likelihood of association in the Trademark Directive. Id. at 602.
Additionally, the European Commission noted that the concept of likelihood of associa-
tion was a concept which developed by Benelux case law. Id.; see also Charles Gielen,
Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First Trade Mark Harmonisation Directive of
the European Council, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 262, 267 (1992) (noting that in minutes
of meetings concerning Trademark Directive, Council and Commission state that likeli-
hood of association is a concept from Benelux caselaw).
150. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5 O.J. L 40/1, at 4 2 (1989). The
Trademark Directive, Article 5 paragraph 2, states that
2. [a]ny Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled
to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of
trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation
to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where
use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental
to, the distinctive character or of the repute of the trade mark.
Id.
151. See Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemschrift 502; XXV Marken-
shutz Und Wettbewerb 264, September 11, 1925 (developing concept known as dilution
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brought the dilution concept to the United -States in 1927,152
however, the U.S. legislature did not offer trademarks statutory
protection against dilution until 1995.153 To date, the European
Union does not mandate that Member States offer trademarks
protection against dilution, but many scholars argue that the
1989 Trademark Directive does include statutory protection for
tradmarks against dilution. 54
1. Definition and Origin of the Dilution Doctrine
Trademark dilution occurs when a trademark's distinctive
quality is reduced due to the use of the trademark on noncom-
peting products. 155 The dilution doctrine provides that trade-
marks may suffer a second type of damage, separate from confu-
sion as to source of origin, that diminishes the trademark's abil-
ity to function as a recognition agent.156 Unlike damage due to
confusion, damage due to dilution does not lessen a consumer's
when Court found trademark infringement by use on dissimilar products, namely that
Odol on steel products infringed earlier use of Odol on mouthwash); MARTINO, supra
note 71, at 4 (discussing origination of concept of dilution by German Civil Court in
Odol case).
152. Schechter, supra note 8, at 825. Schechter did not directly refer to dilution,
instead he commented that U.S. trademark protection should prevent the "gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods." Id.
153. See Andrew D. Sorenson, What Constitutes "Well Known or Famous" Under Minne-
sota's New Dilution Statute, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1079, 1095. (1996) (noting that U.S.
House of Representatives enacted statute granting trademark's dilution protection on
December 12, 1995).
154. See Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5, Oj. L 40/1, at 4 2 (1989)
(stating that Member States have the option, but are not required, to provide trade-
marks that have reputations within Member States with additional protection against
uses on non-similar goods when that use takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to
character of such trademark).
155. See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1162, 1165-66 (1977) (stating that protecting trademarks from dilution prevents loss of
distinctiveness of trademark due to its use on non-competing goods); see also Lanham
Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution as "the lessening of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of com-
petition.").
156. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963) (defin-
ing dilution as diminishment in public's perception of trademark's ability to signify
something unique, singular, or particular); see also Ethan Horowitz & Eric A. Prager,
What Is Dilution and How Is it Proved? Complexities of Question Discussed, Some Useful An-
swers Provided, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at S7 (defining dilution as "the diminishment over
time of the capacity of a distinctive trademark to identify the source of goods bearing
that [trade]mark.").
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ability to determine the source of a good's origin.15 7 Dilution
instead weakens the strength of the trademark by dispersing the
trademark's identity,158 thereby, causing a loss of the trade-
mark's ability to indicate the good.159 The damage due to confu-
sion is immediate, 16 ° while damage due to dilution has been de-
scribed as similar to an infection that slowly destroys the value of
a trademark. 6' Furthermore, protecting trademarks from con-
fusion applies only to uses on identical or similar goods, while
protecting trademarks from dilution extends the protection af-
forded a trademark to situations involving uses on non-similar
goods.
6 2
In 1924, the Elberfeld trial court of Germany upheld a
trademark owner's application to cancel a registration for an
157. See Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating that dilution doctrine focuses on damage to trademark's inherent value and
not whether public has been misled as to source of origin).
158. See Schechter, supra note 8, at (stating that use of trademarks on non-compet-
ing goods damages trademarks by dispersing their identity).
159. See Horowitz & Prager, supra note 156, at S7 (finding that dilution damages
trademark's "uniqueness, singularity and capacity to identify the source of goods sold
under it."). One U.S. District Court stated that "[d]ilution is an injury that differs mate-
rially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of confu-
sion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of
dilution." Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
160. See Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. GMC, 448 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.
1971) (stating that trademark confusion results in immediate loss of sales and immedi-
ate injury).
161. See Mortellito, 335 F. Supp. at 1296 (analogizing damage due to dilution to
viral infection); GMC, 449 F.2d at 1299 (analogizing damage due to dilution to "a can-
cer, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
mark.").
162. See Pro-phy-lac-tic Brush Co. v.Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir.
1948) (describing how dilution doctrine extends trademark protection to situation
where similar marks are used on dissimilar goods). The Pro-pylac-tic court stated that
the dilution doctrine
operates to extend the protection of the trademark law to the situation
presented when similar marks are used on dissimilar goods, and.., it has no
application when the question is whether the marks being used on goods of
substantially the same descriptive properties are similar enough to cause con-
fusion in the minds of consumers with respect to the source of the goods ....
[TIhe dilution doctrine operates to give the owner of a registered trade-mark
the same protection against the use of his mark by others on goods of differ-
ent descriptive properties .... But the marks must be deemed similar before
the doctrine has any application.
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identical trademark on a non-similar good. 163 The trademark
owner used Odol, the trademark in controversy, on mouthwash,
while the registrant sought to obtain the right to use Odol on
steel products.1 64  The Elberfeld Court noted that the Odol
trademark was famous. 16 5 The court then stated that upon see-
ing Odol on steel products, the public would think of the
mouthwash and assume that the steel products were of a high
quality. 166  The court concluded that the owner of the Odol
trademark had an interest in preventing the dilution of the Odol
trademark because any lessening the trademark would negatively
affect the ability of the trademark owner form competing with
other mouthwashes.1 67 This historic decision spawned the trade-
mark concept known as dilution. 6
In 1927, Frank I. Schechter stated that the legislature
should expand the protection afforded trademarks in order to
prevent producers' of non-competing goods from using an-
other's trademark because this use would weaken the trade-
mark's ability to capture the public's mind.169 Schechter's thesis,
thus, introduced the concept now known as the dilution doc-
trine to the U.S.17 ° While not discounting the importance of the
163. See Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemschrift 502; XXV Marken-
shutz Und Wettbewerb 264, September 11, 1925 (developing concept known as dilution
by recognizing infringing use on dis-similar products, namely that Odol on steel prod-
ucts infringed earlier use of Odol on mouthwash).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See MARTINO, supra note 71, at 4 (stating that German court appears to have
originated concept of dilution in Odol case). Tony Martino notes that the court in the
Odol case referred to this concept with the word diluted, instead of the word dilution.
Id. at 5 n.21.
169. See Schechter, supra note 8, at 825. Schechter did not directly refer to dilu-
tion, instead he commented that trademark protection should prevent the "gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods." Id. The principle underlying
Schechter's argument was that the United States did not offer any protection against an
unauthorized use of a trademark on noncompeting goods. Id. at 824-26. To further his
position, Schechter asserted that trademarks sell products thus warranting additional
protection. Id. at 831.
170. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 491 (discussing origins of concept of dilution and
stating that Schechter introduced concept of dilution to United States); MARTINO, supra
note 71, at 4-6 (discussing origination of dilution concept in German Odol case). Some
commentators state that dilution was first developed in the English case of Eastman
Photographic Materials Co. v.John Griffith Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105 (UK) (1898). See Wal-
terJ. Derenberg, The Problem of Trade-Mark Dilution and Anti-Dilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L.
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source identifying function of a trademark, Schechter argued
that dilution protection of trademarks was necessary to provide
adequate and thorough protection of a trademark by preserving
the uniqueness or singularity of a trademark.171 Schechter as-
serted that the aspect of a trademark's uniqueness was important
because in a free-market economy trademarks serve primarily as
marketing tools and only secondarily as identifiers of source. 172
2. Theories of How Dilution Damages a Trademark
U.S. Courts have advanced several theories as to how dilu-
tion damages a trademark. 173 The primary theories, blurring
174
and tarnishment, 175 were the first theories of dilution U.S. courts
articulated and courts often refer to them in cases involving dilu-
tion. 17 6 U.S. courts, later, annunciated the periphery theories,
REV. 439, 448-49 (1956) (discussing Eastman and Odol cases). The Eastman case, how-
ever, does not establish dilution because, while it does involve differing goods, the court
specifically finds a likelihood of confusion. MARTIN, supra note 71, at 4 n.1.
171. Schechter, supra note 8, at 831.
172. Id. at 822. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter stated a similar view in
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Company v. S.S. Kresge Company, 316
U.S. 203 (1942). Frankfurter discussed the psychological function that trademarks play,
stating, "[i]f it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by
them." Id. at 205. Frankfurter also stated that the function of a mark was to convey, "in
the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it ap-
pears." Id.; see also Harris, supra note 149, at 601 (discussing trademarks ability to func-
tion as indicator of quality and publicity).
173. See Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards A Reconciliation with the Lan-
ham Act, 6 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 116-46 (1995) (providing
thorough review of case history surrounding various types of dilution damage theories);
Polaroid, 319 F.2d at 836-37 (stating that dilution can occur by blurring); Tiffany & Co.
v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (D. Mass. 1964) (recognizing that dilu-
tion can occur by tarnishment as well as by blurring); Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F.
Supp. 849, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that trademark genericism constitutes form of
damage due to dilution); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir.
1994) (concluding that alteration of trademark in comparative advertising may damage
trademark by dilution).
174. See Horowitz & Prager, supra note 156, at S7 (stating that dilution by
"[b] lurring occurs when a distinctive trademark is used in connection with non-compet-
ing goods such that the uniqueness of the [trade]mark and its capacity to identify
source is damaged.").
175. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 43 (stating that dilution by tarnishment "arises when the
plaintiffs trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an un-
wholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner's
product.").
176. See Polaroid, 319 F.2d at 836-37 (stating that dilution can occur by blurring);
Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (stating that trademark dilution can occur by tarnish-
ment as well as by blurring); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
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genericization 177 and disparagement. 1
7s
i. Blurring
Legal scholars have referred to blurring as one of the tradi-
tional or classic methods of dilution.1 79 The use of an exact or
similar trademark on a dissimilar product blurs a trademark by
lessening the distinctiveness of a senior trademark.18 ° The blur-
ring theory provides that a consumer knows that the original or
senior trademark owner did not produce the good, but upon
viewing the second or junior user's trademark on the non-com-
petitive goods, the consumer has a mental association with the
senior holder's trademark.18 If this association continues, it will
eventually blur the senior trademark because the senior trade-
mark will no longer remind the purchaser of the unique associa-
tion of the trademark with the senior user's product.1 82
Schechter's oft quoted example provides a demonstration
of how blurring damages a trademark. 83 Schechter postulated
that if competitors were allowed to utilize the trademark Rolls
Royce on any type of non-competing good that eventually the
875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that two forms of trademark dilution are
blurring and tarnishment).
177. See Sykes Lab., 610 F. Supp. at 857 (stating that dilution claim can be brought
under theory that second user's identification of its product as product of senior user
may turn senior trademark into generic term).
178. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 44-45 (noting that dilution can occur in comparative ad-
vertisement when competitor alters trademark).
179. Id. at 42-43; 3 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24.95 (noting that blurring com-
prises one of classic prongs of dilution).
180. See, e.g., Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that use of trade-
mark Lexus for cars does not blur trademark Lexis for computer research software);
McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1280-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (find-
ing that use of trademark McBagels for bagels blurs McDonald's trademarks).
181. See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24.13(2), at 24-115 (noting that blurring oc-
curs because of perception by consumers that trademark represents two different
sources.
182. Id.; see Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Doctrine Ration-
ale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 300 (1984) (explain-
ing that blurring of trademark occurs when consumers stop viewing trademark as indi-
cator of "single thing coming from a single source" and instead consider trademark as
signifying "various things from various sources.").
183. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong. Sess. 15 (1932)
(stating that trademark Rolls Royce would be lost if allowed on any and all non-compet-
ing goods) (quoted in David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L.
Rev. 531, 539 (1991)). Schechter stated that "if you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, and
Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in ten years you
will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more." Id.
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trademark would no longer exist."8 4 The Rolls Royce trademark
would be lost because the consumer's association between the
Rolls Royce trademark and the Rolls Royce car would be blurred
due to its presence on countless other goods. 1 5
ii. Tarnishment
While the theory of dilution by blurring protects the distinc-
tiveness of a trademark,8 6 the tarnishment theory attempts to
protect the quality associations that consumers have for the
trademark. 187 Tarnishment occurs when a junior trademark
holder either uses a senior trademark in an unwholesome or un-
savory context or discolors the distinctiveness of a senior trade-
mark by associating it with undesirable or inferior-quality prod-
ucts."8 Tarnishment damages a trademark because it causes
consumers to view the senior trademark in an unflattering way 8 9
and to associate the junior user's inferior products with the se-
nior user's trademark and products.' 90 This association dimin-
ishes a senior trademark's reputation because consumers will as-
sociate the lack of quality of the junior user's products with the
184. Id.
185. See Staffin, supra note 173, at 118-19 (discussing how Schechter's concerns
enunciated in his example are encompassed by the theory of dilution by blurring).
Staffin modernized the example by inserting the electronic corporation trademark,
Sony. Id. at 119. Staffin stated that if there existed countless non-electronic goods
trademarked under the name Sony, that eventually this widespread, divergent use
would cause dilution to the Sony trademark because consumers would no longer associ-
ate Sony with electronic goods produced by Sony. Id. at 119.
186. See Martin Glenn & Dale M. Cendali, Federal Preemption of State Dilution Statutes,
N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1993, at 1 (stating that dilution statutes protect distinctiveness of
trademarks from blurring).
187. See Staffin, supra note 173, at 131 (stating that implicit in tarnishment theory
"is the notion that a trademark represents the reputation and goodwill of the holder,
which are susceptible to injury.").
188. See McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24.16(1), (3); see also Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. at
844-45 (describing tarnishment as detraction from trademark owner's good will due to
use of trademark on products produced by infringer whose goods cause public dissatis-
faction and this dissatisfaction is held against trademark owner); Hormel Foods Corp. v.
Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that dilution by
tarnishment occurs when trademark owner's trademark is "linked to products of
shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context.").
189. See Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard
of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. Rv. 465, 484 n.94 (1992) (asserting that tarnishment
damages trademark's reputation by creating "unwholesome or negative associations in
consumers' minds.").
190. See Horowitz & Prager, supra note 156, at S7 (discussing how tarnishment
damages trademarks).
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senior user's unrelated products.'91
iii. Disparagement
Trademark disparagement 192 occurs when a junior user al-
ters a senior user's mark so as to mock or denigrate it.193 One
example of this type of dilution is when an advertiser mocks a
widely recognized mark of a competing' 94 or noncompeting
product,195 to promote a product rather than to parody or pro-
vide a social comment. 96
iv. Genericization
Trademark genericization'97 is a form of dilution that oc-
191. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 43 (noting that tarnishment diminishes trademark's repu-
tation and commercial value because public associates lack of quality in infringing
goods with trademark owner's goods).
192. See Howard J. Shire, Lawn Tractor Manufacturer Pays Dearly for Trademark Dilu-
tion: 'Deere v. MTD' Greatly Expands Protection Provided by Statute, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 3, 1995, at
S7 (claiming that U.S. courts could have found disparagement in Deere case under the-
ory of tarnishment).
193. See, e.g., Deere, 41 F.3d at 39 (finding unflattering use of trademark diluted
trademark through disparagement). The Deere court made it clear that it might allow
the use of a trademark for purposes of parody, when the parodist is not selling any
goods. Id. at 44-45. The court indicated that it might also allow the use of a non-
altered trademark in comparative advertising as long as the competitor does not signifi-
candy alter the trademark. Id.; see, e.g., Girl Scouts of U.S.A. v. Personality Posters Mfg.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding that poster depicting pregnant
Girl Scout, which suggests that traditional image of Girl Scouts as wholesome and
chaste is illusory, does not damage Girl Scouts' trademark); R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,
402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that using competitor's trademark in adver-
tisement does not damage trademark).
194. See, e.g., Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 822 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (finding that damage occurred when competitor mocked Wendy's trademark).
The Deere court stressed that advertisements that are "not [done] for worthy purposes of
expression, but [are done] simply to sell products" are not deserving of protection.
Deere, 41 F.3d at 44-45. Furthermore, courts will likely hold that advertisements, which
mock competitors, cause dilution to a trademark because a competitor has "both an
incentive to diminish the favorable attributes of the mark and an ample opportunity to
promote its products... " Id. at 45.
195. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 451-
52 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding no dilution when Coors Brewery spoofed Eveready's trade-
marked Energizer Bunny in advertisement). Even though the Coors court did not find
dilution, the Deere court noted that advertisements, such as the one in Eveready case,
which mock a non-competitor's trademark, can still dilute the selling power of the
mocked trademark, but the court should examine the degree of alteration to the trade-
mark. Deere, 41 F.3d at 45.
196. See Pattishall, supra note 182, at 300 (discussing parody and commentary of
trademark).
197. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12.01, at 12-2 (stating that test for trademark
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curs when a competitor uses a trademark in a way that encour-
ages the public to view the mark as a product type and not a
source indicator.198 The damage inherent in this type of dilu-
tion is that the trademark owner will lose their rights to protec-
tion of the trademark because when a trademark becomes ge-
neric the trademark owner loses all legal protection and any
competitor may use the trademark.19 Competitors may freely
use the trademark because once it is deemed generic, the public
owns the term and no one may trademark the word.2 0 0 Gener-
ally, dilution by genericism can only occur in a few situations,
namely the use of the trademark in advertising and the use of
the trademark in a literary work.20 t
3. U.S. Protection Against Dilution
The United States did not protect trademarks from dilution
through legislation until 1995,202 but certain states offered trade-
genericness is whether consumers think term represents "the generic name of the prod-
uct or a mark indicating merely one source of that product."). A term that is deemed
generic "can never function as a mark to identify and distinguish the products of only
one seller." 2 Id., § 12.01, at 124. The test for genericness examines "what does the
public think the word connotes-the generic name of the product or a mark indicating
merely one source of that product?" 2 Id., § 12.01, at 12-8;J.T. McCARTHY, McCARTHY'S
DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 138 (1991) (stating that generic term is
"[a] word used by a majority of the relevant public to name a class or category of prod-
uct or service. A generic name is incapable of exclusive appropriation or registration as
a protectable trademark .... If one person did have an exclusive right to call a thing by
its generic name, it would be tantamount to a monopoly on selling that type of prod-
uct."); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (finding that trade-
mark Shredded Wheat had become generic and, thus, no longer deserved trademark
protection). Genericide of a trademark occurs when the trademark no longer identi-
fies a unique source of a good, and instead becomes the name for the good. Id.
198. See, e.g., Sykes Lab., 610 F. Supp. at 856 (finding that product entitled Generic
Brand Version of Sykes' Perfect Nail diluted trademark Sykes' Perfect Nails due to possi-
bility of genericism); Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25, 27
(2d Cir. 1978) (finding that book titled Scrabble Dictionary might render Scrabble
trademark generic).
199. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 116 (stating that generic trademark owner does not
have exclusive rights to use of term); PATTISHALL, supra note 3, § 4.01, at 117 (stating
that trademark rights are lost when trademark becomes generic and no longer denotes
good's source of origin).
200. See Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress After Two Pesos, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 408,
415 (1994) (noting that competitors and general public have right to utilize trademarks
which become generic).
201. See Welkowitz, supra note 183, at 559.
202. See Sorenson, supra note 153, at 1095 (stating that U.S. House of Representa-
tives enacted statutory protection for trademarks from dilution on December 12, 1995).
President Clinton signed this statute, known as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
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marks protection from dilution as early as 1947.23 Even without
a Federal statute, Federal courts began protecting trademarks
from dilution. 2 4 Finally, after an unsuccessful initial attempt,2 0 5
Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 199526
to ensure that trademark owners could prevent, and would have
a remedy from, dilution. °7
a. U.S. State Protection
In 1947, twenty years after Schechter's article first discussed
his dilution thesis, 208 Massachusetts passed a statute to protect
trademarks from dilution. 20 9 The Massachusetts statute was the
first legislative protection afforded a trademark against dilution
in the United States.2 10 Other states began to follow suit, and by
1997, twenty-nine states had enacted statutes protecting trade-
marks from dilution. 211  While the dilution provisions vary
1995, into law on January 16, 1996, and it is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Karen S.
Frank, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 Protecting Fame and Fortune, 454 PLI
PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 523, 525
(1996).
203. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 492 n.19 (stating that Massachusetts was first state
to enact statute protecting trademarks against dilution in 1947).
204. PATrISHALL, supra note 3, § 8.01 at n.3. Pattishall notes that Federal Courts
implicitly protected trademarks from dilution by claiming to find a likelihood of confu-
sion where one did not exist. Id.
205. See Sandra Edelman & Bruce R. Ewing, 50th Anniversary of the Lanham Act: The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Litigation Perspective, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 495,
507 (1996) (stating that 1988 attempt to add dilution section to Lanham Act failed).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
207. See Frank, supra note 202, at 525 (stating that Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 creates cause of action for dilution for owner's of famous trademarks).
208. See Schechter, supra note 8, at (urging that uniqueness of trademark should
constitute basis for trademark protection). Schechter's article was published in 1927.
Id.
209. Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. l0B, § 12 (West 1996)); see Welkowitz, supra note 183, at
536 (stating that Massachusetts was first state to enact anti-dilution statute). Illinois and
New York were the next states to enact statutes that offered trademarks protection from
uses that cause dilution. Id.; 1953 Ill. Laws 455, § I (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140,
para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986)); New York, Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 453, § 1 (codified at
N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 368-d (McKinney 1968)).
210. See Derenberg, supra note 170, at 452-59 (summarizing history surrounding
Massachusetts anti-dilution statute and stating that Massachusetts enacted first statute
protecting trademarks from dilution in United States).
211. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (Michie 1993); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50.180 (West 1997); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1995); Califor-
nia, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1997); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 35-11a(11), 35-1li(c) (West 1997); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 6, § 3313 (1996);
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slightly from state to state, 12 they generally provide protection
to any trademark that the courts determine to be distinctive or
strong in its ability to identify the source of origin, and, when a
trademark owner establishes that a junior user has employed a
similar trademark on dissimilar goods or services in a manner
that will injure the trademark's reputation by diluting the trade-
mark's distinctiveness of tarnishing the trademark's image.2 13
b. Federal Protection Prior to 1995
The U.S. Legislature did not immediately follow its state
counterparts in offering trademarks protection from dilution.2 14
In 1988, the House of Representatives rejected a measure which
would have granted trademarks legal protection against uses that
resulted in dilution. 21 5 Federal courts, however, still protected
trademarks from uses that diluted the trademark even though
there was no statutory basis for granting this protection.216
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997) ; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451
(1997); Idaho, § 48-512 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 765, § 1035/
15 (West 1993); Iowa, IA. CODE ANN. § 548.113 (West Supp. 1995); Louisiana, LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 51.223.1 (West 1987); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 1530 (West
1997); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 10B, §.12 (West 1990); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 325D.165 (West 1995); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1972); Mis-
souri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 417.061(1) (West 1990); Montana, Mor. CODE ANN. § 30-13-
334 (1996); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); New Hampshire, N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 1978);
New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (West 1997); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. § 647.107
(1996); Pennsylvania, 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West Supp. 1997); Rhode Island,
R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-2-12 (1956); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-1105(2), 39-
15-1165 (Law. Co-op 1976); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (Michie 1988);
Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1995); Washington, WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.77.010(6), 19.77.160 (West 1989 and Supp. 1995); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE § 47-2-13 (1996), and Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. § 40-1-115 (West 1997).
212. David S. Versfelt, Early Developments Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
954 PLI CORP. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 323, 329 (1996).
213. See id. (discussing requirements that most state st~atues utilize in determining
trademark dilution).
214. Compare H.R. REP. No. 104-1295 (1996) (enacting Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion protection in 1996) with Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300
(codified as amended at MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. lIOB, § 12 (West 1996)) (enacting
first state trademark dilution protection in 1947).
215. Lisa M. Brownlee, Mead Data Central v. Toyota and other Contemporary Dilution
Cases: High Noon for Trademark Law's Misfit Doctrine?, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 471, 472
(1989) (discussing removal of proposed dilution act from 1988 Trademark Revision
Act).
216. See PATTISHALL, supra note 3, § 8.01 at n.3 (discussing cases where U.S. courts
implicitly relied on dilution doctrine, without any statutory support, in protecting trade-
marks from uses that judges considered infringing).
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i. Judicial Efforts to Prevent Dilution
Even without a statutory basis for protecting trademarks
from dilution, federal courts began to implicitly protect against
dilution by finding a likelihood of confusion when no likelihood
of confusion was actually present.217 In Quality Inns Int'l v. Mc-
Donald's Corp.,218 the U.S. District Court for Maryland found a
likelihood of confusion, but it has been asserted that the court
was actually recognizing dilution.2 1 9 The Quality Inns case re-
volved around Quality Inns' plans to market an economy hotel
chain entitled McSleep Inn.220  In response to Quality Inns'
plan, McDonald's Corporation demanded that Quality Inns not
utilize the name McSleep Inn because it infringed upon McDon-
ald's trademarked Mc-words.2 2 1 Quality Inns then brought suit
seeking a declaratory judgment that the trademark McSleep Inn
did not infringe McDonald's trademarks.222 McDonald's initi-
ated counterclaims against Quality Inns, alleging trademark in-
fringement and dilution. 221
217. PA-rISHALL, supra note 3, § 8.01 at n.3. Pattishall notes that even prior to
Schechter's development of the dilution doctrine, courts were resolving trademark
cases with an implicate reliance on the yet unnamed concept of dilution. Id.; see Wall v.
Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir. 1925) (protecting automobile trade-
mark Rolls Royce from use on radio tubes). After the publication of Schechter's thesis
on dilution, courts continued to implicitly rely, without legislative authority, on the di-
lution concept to settle trademark cases. See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d
348, 353 (9th Cir. 1948) (finding that use of New York restaurant's trademarked logo by
bar in California displayed enough likelihood of confusion to justify injunction).
218. 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
219. See Hansen, supra note 96 (asserting that in ruling for infringement in McSleep
case, court was implicitly relying on concept of dilution). Professor Hansen states that
the evidence of confusion relied upon by the court would not establish a likelihood of
confusion. Id. He further states that the policy considerations for protecting trade-
marks, namely that Quality Inns would be usurping McDonald's good will, thereby di-
luting McDonald's trademark via blurring, lead the court to find dilution. Id.
220. Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 202.
221. Id. at 201-03. In 1977, McDonald's started an advertising campaign based
upon a McLanguage. Id. at 203. This language featured the prefix Mc and a noun or
adjective, such as McService, McPrice, and McBest. Id. Furthermore, McDonald's has
registered trademarks for numerous other Mc words, including McChicken, Egg
McMuffin, McCola, McFeast, and McPizza. Id.
222. Id. at 201.
223. Id. McDonald's alleged dilution violations under the Illinois Anti-Dilution
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 140 § 22. Id. Without ever analyzing or discussing the Illinois
dilution statute, the Court does state that dilution had occurred. Id. at 221. Professor
Hugh C. Hansen asserts that in actuality the dilution theory drove the case, yet because
a federal dilution statute did not exist, the Court hid their holding behind a finding of
confusion. Hansen, supra note 96.
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The Court noted that both the McSleep trademark and Mc-
Donald's trademarks identified products in unrelated markets,
and that in situations like that, both trademarks could coexist
without causing confusion.224 In support of this proposition, the
court noted that several other dissimilar products that used the
same trademark, namely, Notre Dame cheese and Notre Dame
University, Bulova watches and Bulova shoes, and this Bud's for
you for beer and flower commercials.225 Also, the survey evi-
dence Quality Inns admitted at trial226 further established that
no likelihood of confusion existed between McDonald's and Mc-
Sleep.227 The Court, however, stated that the public can none-
theless receive a perception or expectation that goods emanate
from the same source when the markets for the products are
close. 2 8 The Court, finally, concluded that the McSleep trade-
mark would infringe upon McDonald's trademarks due to the
likelihood of confusion between the two trademarks and be-
cause of dilution. 229
A second example of federal courts protecting a trademark
against dilution and finding confusion where none existed is
224. Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 210.
225. Id. The goods offered by McDonald's and Quality Inn were noncompeting
and, therefore, under a strict confusion test, the McSleep trademark should have been
allowed. Hansen, supra note 96.
226. Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 207-09. Quality International utilized a mall in-
tercept survey which is performed by showing participants, at various shopping malls,
visual stimuli and obtaining their responses. Id. at 207. The mall intercept survey em-
ployed four separate tests. Id. The first showed a magazine advertisement for Quality
Inns that referred to McSleep, but did not specifically advertise McSleep. Id. 57% of
those surveyed realized that McSleep was being advertised and 7.5% of them thought
that McDonald's operated McSleep. Id. The second was a telephone directory adver-
tisement where McSleep Inn was advertised with the McSleep logo. Id. 83% of those
surveyed realized that McSleep was being advertised and 10.3% of them thought that
McDonald's operated McSleep. Id. The third was an artist's rendering of a proposed
McSleep Inn, including a sign which stated the name McSleep. Id. 90% of those sur-
veyed realized that McSleep was being advertised and 16.3% of them thought that Mc-
Donald's operated McSleep. Id. The fourth was a picture of an Egg McMuffin with the
word Egg McMuffin printed underneath it. Id. at 208. 87% of those surveyed realized
was the producer of the Egg McMuffin. Id.
227. See Hansen, supra note 96 (asserting that survey evidence was at best inconclu-
sive as to confusion and more likely established that no confusion was present).
228. See Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 210 (stating that trademarks have been pro-
tected against infringing uses on non-competitive, but related, goods); Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (originating theory that trademarks
deserve protection against infringing uses on closely related, but non-competitive,
goods).
229. Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 221.
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Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.23" The
plaintiff, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, are a cheerleading
squad that perform dance and cheerleading routines at the
games of the American football team the Dallas Cowboys.2 3 1
Furthermore, the cheerleaders make numerous television and
public appearances and license others to produce and distribute
posters, calenders, T-shirts, and other goods that depict the
cheerleaders in their uniforms.232 At all times, the members of
the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders are dressed in their distinctive
OUtfits2 3 3 for which they possess a valid trademark. 234
The defendant, Pussycat Cinema Ltd., is a New York corpo-
ration who owns a movie theater located in New York City.23 5 In
November of 1978, the Pussycat Cinema began to show Debbie
Does Dallas, a pornographic movie.2 3 6 The plot of this movie sur-
rounds a high school cheerleader, Debbie, who has been se-
lected to become a Texas Cowgirl. 23 7 In order to raise money
with which to send Debbie to Dallas, Debbie and her fellow
cheerleaders engage in various sexual escapades for money.238
The final scene of the movie involves Debbie donning a uniform
that is similar to those worn by the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders. 239 Finally, while wearing all or some of the uniform,
Debbie engages in various sex acts for approximately twelve min-
utes.24o
230. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). See Ethan Horowitz, Advance Trademark Law
Lecture at Fordham University School of Law (Sept. 17, 1997) (stating that courts have
found ways to protect trademarks against dilution and Pussycat was example of court
finding likelihood of confusion where one did not exist).
231. Pussycat, 604 F.2d at 202.
232. Id.
233. See id. (discussing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniforms and stating that
they consist of "white vinyl boots, white shorts, a white belt decorated with blue stars, a
blue bolero blouse, and a white vest decorated with three blue stars on each side of the
front and a white fringe around the bottom.").
234. Id. at 203-04 (granting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders trademark rights in their
uniforms because they are arbitrary and functional use does not prohibit granting
trademark in clothes) (citing In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 681 (Cust. & Pat.
App. 1977)).
235. Id. at 202.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court noted that the district court found that the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders also possessed a trademark in the name "Texas Cowgirl," which was made
popular by the media. Id. at n.1.
238. Id. at 203.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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In response to this final scene and the advertising surround-
ing the movie, 241 the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders brought suit
against Pussycat Cinema alleging trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act, unfair competition, and dilution in violation of
section 368-d of the New York General Business Law.2 42 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders had succeeded
in proving each of their allegations4.24  As to dilution, the court
merely sets forth the definition and rationale behind dilution
and then states that it is clearly present in this situation.244 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, af-
firmed the findings of the district court.2 4 5
Pussycat Cinema's primary defense against plaintiffs in-
fringement and dilution allegations is that the Lanham Act only
protects trademarks against uses that confuse the consumer as to
the origin of a good.246 The court stated that this reading of
confusion was too narrow.2 4 7 In the court's opinion, all that was
necessary to satisfy the confusion requirement was that the pub-
lic perceived that the trademark owner sponsored or otherwise
approved the use of the trademark.248
The court then analyzed the plaintiffs contentions.249 In
the court's eyes, it was unquestionable -that the uniform used in
Debbie Does Dallas causes viewers to call to mind the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, thereby associating them with the
movie.2 50 The court proceeds to state, without discussing dilu-
tion, that the aforementioned mental association between the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders trademark and the movie Debbie
Does Dallas results in confusion which injures the Dallas Cow-
241. Id. In order to advertise Debbie Does Dallas, Pussycat Cinema utilized mar-
quee posters and newspaper ads that depicted Debbie in the infringing uniform. Id.
242. Id.; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 467 F. Supp.
366, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
243. See Pussycat, 467 F. Supp. at 374-78 (granting preliminary injunction based
upon fact that Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders made meritorious showing as to likelihood
of success as to these issues).
244. See id. at 377 (discussing how continued use of trademarked uniform in por-
nographic movie would dilute and whittle down trademark's reputation and good will).
245. Pussycat, 604 F.2d at 202.
246. Id. at 204.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 205.
249. Id. at 205-07.
250. Id. at 205.
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boys Cheerleaders business reputation.25'
ii. Legislative Attempts to Prevent Dilution
In 1988, Congress attempted to provide federally recog-
nized protection against dilution of trademarks by incorporating
a dilution provision into a proposed amendment to the Lanham
Act, the Trademark Revision Act.2 52 The proposed dilution pro-
vision would have provided federal protection against dilution
only for trademarks that were famous. 25 3 The House of Repre-
sentatives, however, did not accept this proposal because it was
concerned that protecting a trademark from dilution would in-
fringe upon advertisers' First Amendment rights. 25 4  Accord-
ingly, the House of Representatives removed the dilution provi-
sion from their version of the Trademark Revision Act. 255 Fi-
nally, after a compromise between the Senate and the House of
Representatives, they passed the Trademark Revision Act with-
out the dilution provision. 25 6
c. Feder'al Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
In 1995, Congress enacted federal protection for dilution by
amending the Lanham Act to include the Federal Trademark
251. Id. (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963)).
252. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 525 (1995) (stating that in 1988 Lan-
ham Act was nearly amended to include provision providing trademarks protection
against dilution); Garcia, supra note 11, at 492 (discussing Congresses considerations in
1987-88 to amend Lanham Act to include provision offering trademarks protection
against diluting uses).
253. Garcia, supra note 11, at 513.
254. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, 2d Sess. (1988). During the legislative proceedings
that preceded enactment of the Trademark Revision Act, the Senate supported the
inclusion of a dilution provision, S. REP. No. 1883, 100th Cong, 2d Sess. (1988), but the
House of Representatives were against the idea, and when strong opposition was voiced
by the advertising, publishing and broadcasting industries arising out of First Amend-
ment concerns, the dilution provision was left. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, 100th Cong, 2d
Sess (1988); seeJerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is it Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
108, 114-15 (1993) (discussing events leading up to enactment of Federal Dilution Act).
255. See Brownlee, supra note 215, at 472 (discussing removal of dilution provision
from 1988 Trademark Revision Act).
256. Id.; see Garcia, supra note 11, at 492 (discussing last minute compromise be-
tween Senate and House of Representatives).
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Dilution Act of 1995 ("Dilution Act").257 The Dilution Act be-
came effective on January 16, 1996 when President Clinton
signed the Act.2 58 In order to receive protection under the Dilu-
tion Act against dilution, a trademark must meet the criteria for
a famous trademark that is set forth in the statute.25 9
257. H.R. REP. No. 104-1295 (1996). Congress amended section 43 of the Lanham
Act by inserting the following subsection:
(c) (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is
provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15. U.S.C. § 1125(c).
258. See Versfelt, supra note 212, at 333-34 (stating that Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act became effective immediatly when signed by President Clinton on January 16,
1996).
259. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(A)-(H) (listing factors that Courts should consider in
determining whether trademark is distinctive). The statute sets forth the following fac-
tors which should be considered:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § l125(c)(A)-(H).
906 FORDHAMNTERATATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:861
4. EU Member State Protection Against Trademark Dilution
To date, the EU has not passed EU wide legislation mandat-
ing protection of trademarks from dilution. 260 The Trademark
Directive, furthermore, while attempting to harmonize legisla-
tion between Member States, allows individual Member States to
freely interpret the Trademark Directive and to impose their
original laws. 261 Allowing Member States the freedom to inter-
pret the provisions of the Trademark Directive has resulted in
one Member State, the United Kingdom, not offering trade-
marks protection from dilution under the Trademark Directive's
mandatory likelihood of association provision 26 2 or under the
non-mandatory dilution provision.263
a. Benelux Countries
The Benelux countries offer trademarks protection from di-
lution.264 Benelux courts have based dilution protection on the
wording of Article 13 (a) (2) of the Uniform Benelux Trademark
Law ("Benelux Trademark Law"), which states that trademarks
260. See Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 2 (1989)
(stating that Member States have option to protect trademarks from uses that dilute
trademark's distinctiveness). Several legal scholars have claimed that dilution protec-
tion is found in the wording likelihood of association, but the UK courts did not inter-
preted this provision to provide dilution protection. See Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre
Restaurants PLC, [1995) F.S.R. 713, 730 (UK) (finding that inclusion of phrase likeli-
hood of association does not extend trademark protection to uses that do not result in
confusion as to product's origin); Baywatch Production Co. Ltd. v. Home Video Chan-
nel, [1997] F.S.R. 22, 30 (UK) (stating that likelihood of association does not grant
trademarks any protection without presence of likelihood of confusion).
261. See Gielen, supra note 149, at 264 (stating that existing national trademark
rights continue to exist under Trademark Directive).
262. See Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art.'5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 1(b) (1989)
(stating that Member States must protect trademarks from uses that infringe due to any
resulting likelihood of association); Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 730 (finding that
Trademark Directive's phrase likelihood of association does not extend trademark pro-
tection to uses that do not result in confusion as to product's origin),.
263. Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5, O.J. L 40/1, at 4 2 (1989) (provid-
ing that Member States may protect trademarks that have reputations from uses on
non-similar goods that take unfair advantage of or are detrimental to the character of
such trademark); Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 30-31 (finding that Trademark Directive's
article paragraph 2 did not grant trademarks any protection absent showing of likeli-
hood of confusion).
264. See Ethan Horowitz, Foreign Trademark Practice, C602 A.L.I. 27, 50 (stating that
Benelux countries have elaborate dilution rules); W. MAK & H. MOLUN, INTRODUCTION
TO TRADE MARK LAw IN THE BENELUX 52-53 (1982) (discussing situations where Benelux
offers dilution protection to trademarks).
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will be protected from any economic use that is prejudicial to
the owner of the trademark. 265 The case law surrounding Article
13 of the Benelux Trademark Act demonstrates that Benelux
courts find that many, but not all, unauthorized uses of a trade-
mark can constitute dilution of a trademark.266
The Trademark Directive was largely inspired by the
Benelux Trademark Law, and therefore, the Trademark Direc-
tive did not alter the Benelux Trademark Law to a large ex-
tent.267 The only significant change affecting the Benelux ap-
proach to infringement, and specifically dilution, is the addition
of a reputation requirement and a description of the type of
damage that is protected against, namely uses that damage the
distinctive character or the reputation of the trademark. 268 A
265. See Uniform Benelux Trademark Law art. 13(a) (2) (describing rights trade-
mark owner possess against others). Article 13(a) (2) of the Benelux Trademark Act
states that
Without prejudice to the possible application of ordinary civil law in matters of
civil liability, the proprietor of a mark may, by virtue of his exclusive right,
oppose:
any other use, in economic intercourse, of the mark or of a like symbol made
without a valid reason under circumstances likely to be prejudicial to the pro-
prietor of the mark.
Id. See also MAX & MOLIJN, supra note 264, at 52-57 (discussing protection offered trade-
mark owners by article 13(a) (2) of Benelux Trademark Act). The Benelux Trademark
Law came into effect on January 1, 1971 and was added as an annex to the Benelux
Treaty of Trade Marks ("BTM") of March, 19, 1962. Id. at 1,2. The Benelux Trademark
Law provided Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg with one system of trade-
mark law. Gielen, supra note 149, at 262. In order to uniformly enforce this joint act,
the countries created a supranational Benelux Court of Justice. Id. Prior to the
Benelux Trademark Law, the Benelux countries each maintained different trademark
laws. MAx & MOLIJN, supra note 264, at 12. In creating the Benelux Trademark Law,
each of the three Benelux countries compromised, therefore, each member country
did not consider every provision in the BMW as an improvement. Id. Nonetheless, all
three countries enacted the Benelux Trademark Law pursuant to Article 1 of the BTM
which required them to include the Benelux Trademark Law in their legislation. Id.
266. See Claeryn/Klarein 7 I.I.C. 420 (1975) (finding use of Klarein trademark for
all-purpose cleanser dilutes Claeryn trademark for gin); but see 1976 B.I.E. 214 (finding
that female pornography film star masturbating with Coca-Cola bottle did not dilute
Coca-Cola's trademark).
267. "Main Changes in the Trade Mark Law" News Sections: National Reports,
Benelux, [1994] 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-195.
268. In Claeyyn, the Benelux Court stated that trademarks did not have to be
deemed famous to receive protection under Article 13 of the Benelux Trademark Law.
Claeiyn, 7 I.I.C. at 424. However, the new protocol states that
[r]egardless of the application of the general law concerning responsibility on
the basis of tort, on the basis of his exclusive right the trademark holder may
oppose against: (c) any use, without due cause in the course of trade, where
the mark or similar sign has a reputation in the Benelux, in relation to goods,
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Benelux trademark now must have a reputation in order for the
owner to successfully bring a dilution suit.269
b. United Kingdom
In response to the Trademark Directive, the United King-
dom enacted new legislation, the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act
("Trade Marks Act") .270 The most significant dilution related
additions to UK law were the inclusion of the directive mandated
likelihood of association 27 1 and the incorporation of language
which offered protection for the distinctive character of a trade-
mark against uses on goods which are not similar.272 Several
dissimilar to those for which the mark is registered, if this use can lead to the
unfair taking of advantage of, or detriment to the distinctive character or re-
pute of the mark.
Uniform Benelux Trade Mark Law art. 13(1) (c). Benelux did not define the word
reputation in the Protocol. "Main Changes in the Trade Mark Law" News Sectiois:
National Reports, Benelux, [1994] 8 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. D-195. t
269. See id. (stating that Benelux law now has reputation requirement for trade-
marks seeking protection).
270. See 1994 UK Trade Marks Act (enacting, into UK law, provisions from Trade-
mark Directive).
271. See Gielen, supra note 149, at 262. Article 5(1) (b) of the Trademark Directive
provides protection against uses where "there exists a likelihood of confusion on the
part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and
the trade mark." Trademark Directive, supra note 1, art. 5 O.J. L 40/1, at 4 1(b)
(1989). The United Kingdom has incorporated this language into section 10 of their
recently enacted 1994 UK Trade Marks Act. Section 10 reads in relevant part:
10(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign
Which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identi-
cal with those for which it is registered.
(2) A person infringes a trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign where
because -
(a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or
services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, or
(b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services
identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, there exists
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood
of association with the trade mark.
1994 UK Trade Marks Act § 10(1)(2).
272. See id. at § 10(3) (offering trademarks protection against uses that take advan-
tage of reputation of trademark or uses that damage trademark's character). Section
10(3) states that:
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign
which -
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which
the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the
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legal scholars believed that the inclusion of a likelihood of asso-
ciation for finding infringement would allow trademarks dilu-
tion protection in the United Kingdom.273 These scholars based
their conclusion on the fact that the Trademark Directive was
largely influenced by Benelux law which interprets the likeli-
hood of association as protecting a trademark whenever the
trademark is called to mind.274
When confronted with the likelihood of association, how-
ever, the Chancery Division of the United Kingdom did not be-
lieve that the Benelux interpretation had to control, and they
concluded that any infringement under a likelihood of associa-
tion still required a finding by the court of a likelihood of confu-
sion, thereby refusing to recognize dilution protection.275 The
Chancery Division also stated that section 10(3), which protects
trademarks that have a reputation from damage to the trade-
marks goodwill or that tarnishes the trademark, does not apply
unless their is a showing of a likelihood of confusion.276 This
occurred in the cases of Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants
PLC277 and Baywatch Prod. Co., Inc. v. Home Video Channel.27 8
WAGAMAMA is the trademark of a Japanese restaurant
sign, being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
Id.
273. See Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994
UK Trade Marks Act, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 67, 69 (1995) (stating that section 10(3)
protection falls under dilution.doctrine because it provides protection for uses on non-
similar goods, thereby recognizing protection when source doctrine does not apply);
Harris, supra note 149, at 601 (stating that UK trademark law practitioners believed that
inclusion of "likelihood of association" in 1994 Trade Marks Act would liberalize and
extend protection UK affords trademarks).
274. See Gielen, supra note 149, at 264 (discussing how Benelux trademark law
influenced Trademark Directive); Harris, supra note 149, at 601 (noting that origin of
likelihood of association is found within Benelux case law and that Benelux countries
protect trademarks whenever trademark 'is called to mind).
275. See Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants PLC, [1995] F.S.R. 713, 730
(UK) (finding that inclusion of phrase likelihood of association in 1994 Trade Marks
Act, section 10(2), does not extend trademark protection to uses that do not result in
confusion as to product origin); Baywatch Production Co. Ltd. v. Home Video Channel,
[1997] F.S.R. 22, 30 (UK) (stating that 1994 Trade Marks Act, section 10(3), does not
grant trademarks protection unless likelihood of confusion is present).
276. [1997] F.S.R. at 31.
277. [1995] F.S.R. 713 (UK). The Wagamama case was .the English High Courts
first opportunity to examine and discuss the phrase likelihood of association. Harris,
supra note 149, at 602.
278. [1997] F.S.R. 22 (UK).
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chain. 279 The restaurant opened in 1992 and has become fairly
successful, developing an excellent reputation in England and
winning numerous culinary awards.280 In 1995, an American
theme restaurant, serving Indian food, opened and named
themselves RAJAMAMA. 281 The WAGAMAMA trademark owner
brought suit alleging trademark infringement and passing off.282
In response, the owner's of RAJAMAMA altered the name of the
restaurant to RAJA MAMA'S. 283
The Chancery Division noted that under the 1938 Trade-
mark Act, UK courts determined trademark infringement by an-
swering the question of whether the mark complained of was
confusingly similar to the registered trademark. 2 4 The court
further stated that UK courts only found trademark infringe-
ment when a consumer associated a good with another trade-
mark only if that association led to confusion as to source of ori-
gin. 8' The Chancery Division termed trademark infringement
under the 1938 Act as classic infringement.28 6
The Chancery Division further noted that this type of classic
infringement continued to constitute a cause of action under
the 1994 Trade Marks Act.2 8 7 Wagamama, however, asserted
that aside from classic infringement, the 1994 Trade Marks Act
also offered protection against the mere association between the
trademarks.288 Wagamama's counsel argued that infringement
would be found if the registered trademark was called to mind
279: Wagamama, ['1997] F.S.R. at 717.
280. Id. at 717-18.
281. Id. at 718.
282. Id. at 719.
283. Id. at 718.
284. Id. at 720-21. The Court noted that "[u]nder the 1938 Act .... [w]hether
there was infringement was determined by answering the question 'is the mark of which
complaint is made confusingly similar' to the one which is registered." Id. at 720. Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that the case law surrounding the 1938 Act "made it clear
that what counted was confusion as to the source of the goods or services bearing the
offensive mark." Id.
285. Id. at 721. The Court noted that under the 1938 Act, "the confusion which
was looked for was confusion as to source or origin of the goods .... [and that] the
association had to be an association as to source of origin." Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. The Chancory Division commented that "[t]here [was] no dispute be-
tween the parties that such classic infringement by confusion as to the source of origin
of goods or services will also constitute an infringement under section 10 of the 194
Act." Id.
288. Id.
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by a customer regardless of whether the customer was confused
as to source of origin.289 Plaintiff claimed this type of protection
was found in the wording of section 10(2) of the 1994 Trade
Marks Act which offers trademarks protection against the likeli-
hood of confusion which includes the likelihood of associa-
tion.29 ° Wagamama's counsel further asserted that the proper
interpretation of this language is found by examining Benelux
case law.2
9 1
The court, through Justice Laddie, outrightly rejected any
extension of trademark rights to situations where a likelihood of
confusion was not present.292 The court rationalized that the
Benelux view did not have to control and that the addition of
the phrase likelihood of association did not have to expand the
protection afforded trademarks. 29 ' The Wagamama court fur-
ther stated that the extension of any trademark rights to situa-
tions where no confusion was present would grant a monopoly
289. Id. The Chancory Division stated that:
[Wagamama] says that section 10(2), covers confusion in a much broader
sense. [Wagamama asserts] that the registered proprietor can prevent mere
association between the marks. [Wagamama] argue[s] that there will now be
infringement if, on seeing the defendant's mark, the registered mark would
be 'called to mind' by a customer even if there is no possibility of the customer
being under any misapprehension as to the origin of the goods. This is a new
concept to those steeped in British trade mark law.
Id.
290. Id. at 721-22. The language of section 10(2) of the 1994 Trade Marks Act is
almost identical to the wording of Article 5 of the Trademark Directive. Harris, supra
note 149, at 601.
291. Id. at 722-28. Wagamama
advance[d] a group of arguments based upon the European origins of the
1994 Act in support of the proposition that [the UK] trade mark law must be
construed to be consistent with Benelux trade mark law where non-origin asso-
ciation has for some years been accepted as a form of trade mark infringe-
ment.
Id. at 722.
292. Id. at 730-31. Justice Laddie noted that
there are two possible constructions which may be placed on Article 5 of the
[Trademark Directive] and section 10(2) of the [Trade Marks Act]. The
rights of the proprietor against alleged infringers may be limited to classic
infringement which includes association as to origin or, following the Benelux
route, it could cover not only classic infringement but also non-origin associa-
tion. In my view, the former construction is to be preferred.
Id. at 730.
293. Id. at 731.Justice Laddie stated that "[i]f it had been the [Comission's] inten-
tion to make the [Trademark Directive] identical with Benelux law on this important
issue it could have said so." Id.
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to the trademark owner, thereby thwarting interbrand competi-
tion.29 4 Finally, the Wagamama court rejected the notion that
trademarks serve as anything other than an indicator of the
source of origin.2"'
The Chancery Division's next opportunity to rule on the
1994 Trade Marks Act came in Baywatch Prod. Co. Ltd. v. Home
Video Channel.29 a Baywatch is a popular television series that is
produced and marketed by a U.S. company.297 The series is one
of the top television series in the United Kingdom. 29' During
the introduction and, generally, at some point during each epi-
sode of the television show, a group of male and female life-
guards wearing red bathing suits and carrying floatation devices
run down the beach usually in order to save and resuscitate a
drowning victim. 299
The Adult Channel is a television network that broadcasts
erotic adult entertainment to its subscribers. 00 The Adult Chan-
nel has approximately 150,000 subscribers, and no one outside
of this group is able to view the broadcasts. 0 1 In May and June
of 1996, The Adult Channel broadcast episodes of a porno-
graphic film entitled Babewatch. °2 This film begins with a
294. Id. at 730-31. Justice Laddie asserted that if the protection afforded trade-
marks was expanded to include infringement via non-origin association then "the
[Trademark] Directive and [the Trade Marks] Act would be creating a new type of
monopoly not related to the proprietor's trade but in the trade mark iteself," Id.
295. Id. at 722.
296. [1997] F.S.R. 22 (UK).
297. Id. at 22.
298. Id. at 25. The Court noted that
[i]t appears that the programme [Baywatch] has been the second most popu-
lar United States series with a 41.9 per cent share of viewers at the time the
programme is shown. It is also rated as one of the top TV series in the United
Kingdom produced by a company outside the United Kingdom.
Id.
299. Id. at 24. In describing Baywatch, the Court stated that the show
is set in California and features a team of lifeguards who patrol the Santa
Monica beaches. The members of the team wear a distinctive uniform consist-
ing of a red jacket and a red costume with a circular badge on the left-hand
side. The badge includes a logo and the words 'Baywatch' and 'Lifeguard'....
Each programme in the series involves at least one rescue by the lifeguards
which invariably involves the lifeguards running along the beaches together
and may also involve resuscitation of the victim.
Id.
300. Id. at 25.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 25-26.
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beach sequence similar to Baywatch wherein characters wearing
red bathing suits and carrying floatation devices run down a
beach in order to save a drowning victim, however, in this ver-
sion, soon after running down the beach the characters engage
in sexual acts.3 03
In Baywatch, Baywatch sought an interlocutory injunction,
thereby preventing any rebroadcast of Babewatch until the end
of a full hearing." 4 Baywatch asserted three causes of action,
namely trademark infringement under section 10(2) and 10(3)
of the Trade Marks Act and passing off. 305 Baywatch contended
that The Adult Channel's use of Babewatch was intended to take
advantage of the reputation and distinctive character of the
Baywatch trademark.3 0 6  Furthermore, Baywatch claimed that
the Babewatch series tarnished Baywatch's reputation.0" Addi-
tionally, Baywatch admitted that there was no likelihood of con-
fusion between the Baywatch program and the Babewatch pro-
gram.S°0
The Chancery Division, relying on Justice Robin Jacob's de-
cision from British Sugar Plc. v. James Robinson & Sons Ltd.,3 °9
stated that section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act does not merely
ask is there confusion, but it also asks whether the goods are
similar. 310 The court further stated that if both questions were
not asked then strong trademarks would receive protection of a
303. Id. at 26. After viewing excerpts from Baywatch and Babewatch, the Chancory
Division described the Babewatch program as
begin[ing] with a beach scene not dissimilar to that in Baywatch with actresses
wearing red swimming costumes, carrying red floats and running along the
beach. The beach scenes are filmed on a beach which looks similar to that
used as the setting in Baywatch. After a brief introduction reminiscent of the
opening scences of Baywatch, the Babewatch programme contains sexually ex-
plicit material, including scenes of oral and group sex.
Id.
304. Id. at 27.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 26. Baywatch contended "that the defendant's use of Babewatch, a simi-
lar trade mark to the registered trade mark Baywatch in connection with a television
programme, was clearly intended to take advantage of the reputation and distinctive
character of the plaintiffs trade mark." Id.
307. Id. at 27.
308. Id. at 28.
309. [1996] R.P.C. 281 (UK)
310. Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 28. In British Sugar, Justice Jacob stated that "[t]he
sub-section [10(2)] does not merely ask 'will there be confusion?': it asks 'is there simi-
larity of goods?', if so, 'is there a likelihood of confusion?"' [1996] R.P.C. at 294.
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greater range as compared to weak trademarks. 1" The court
concluded that Baywatch and Babewatch were not goods of a
similar nature, and, therefore, the question of whether there is a
likelihood of confusion does not arise. 12  Furthermore, the
court stated that for purposes of section 10(2) there must be
confusion as to source of origin, not merely a likelihood that the
other trademark will be recalled by the consumer. 13
The court proceeded to analyze Baywatch's claim of trade-
mark infringement under section 10(3) of the Trade Marks
Act.3 14 Baywatch argued that section 10(3) was drafted to pro-
vide protection for trademark owners when another person ap-
propriates the trademark's goodwill or acts in a way which tar-
nishes the trademark's reputation through the association of the
infringing trademark and the registered trademark. 15 Baywatch
further asserted that trademark infringement could be found
under section 10(3), regardless of whether there was any confu-
sion of the public.3 16
The Chancery Division did not agree with this assertion,
stating that it was not well founded. 1 ' The court concluded that
the use of the concept of similarity in section 10(3) introduces
the concept of likelihood of confusion as a requirement for
trademark infringement. 31 This conclusion was based on a de-
termination that neither the Trademark Directive, nor the White
Paper on the Trade Marks Act, support giving a greater amount
of protection to trademarks in situations where the use of a simi-
311. Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 28. The Chancery Division noted thatJustice Lad-
die argued that if the "Kodak" trademark were used on socks on bicycles there might be
confusion, but no infringement due to the fact that socks and bicycles are not similar to
films or cameras. Id. (quoting British Sugar, [1996] R.P.C. at 294). Justice Laddie stated
that "if one [asked] the two questions then a 'strong' mark would get protection for a
greater range of goods than a 'weak' mark. For instance 'Kodak' for socks or bicycles
might well cause confusion, yet these goods are plainly dissimilar from film or cameras."
British Sugar, [1996] R.P.C. at 294.
312. Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 28-29. In support of this contention, the court
cited the fact that the Babewatch show is encryptically broadcast in the early hours of
the morning, compared to Baywatch which may be viewed during the day by anyone
with a television set. Id. at 28.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 30.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 31.
318. Id.
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lar trademark was not on a similar good or service.31' Further-
more, the Court goes on to conclude that trademark infringe-
ment under section 10(3) is only found when an unauthorized
user uses a trademark which is similar to a registered trademark,
so that there is a likelihood of confusion, uses a trademark that
has a reputation in the United Kingdom on goods that are not
similar to the trademark's goods, and the use of the trademark
takes advantage of or is detrimental to the trademark.3 20 Ac-
cordingly, the Chancery Division dismissed Baywatch's motion
for an interlocutory injunction.32'
The rules to be taken from Wagamarna and Baywatch, as
summarized by Sir Robin Jacob, Justice of the UK Chancery Divi-
sion, is that the United Kingdom will not protect trademarks
from uses that cause dilution unless there is a showing of a likeli-
hood of confusion.322 Furthermore, the likelihood of associa-
409n language from section 10(2) also requires a showing of con-
fusion before any protection will be granted a trademark be-
cause association is a species of the genus confusion.3 23  Finally,
any finding of trademark infringement under section 10(3) also
requires a showing of confusion. 24
319. Id. at 30-31. The court's decision was based in part on the unpublished opin-
ion ofJustice Knox from BASFPlc. v. CEP Plc.. In that decision, Justice Knox states that
"neither the distinctive character nor the repute of the plaintiffs mark is adversely af-
fected when there is no risk of relevant confusion." Id.
320. Id. at 31. The Chancery division concludes that section 10(3) only applies
when:
1. A sign which is similar to the trade mark, so that there is a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public, is used in relation to goods and services which are not similar to
the mark. 2. The mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom.
3. The use of the sign, being without due cause, takes advantage of, or is detrimental to
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
Id.
321. Id. at 33.
322. See Chancery Division Justice, Sir Robin Jacob, Lecture at the Fifth Annual
International Intellectual Property Law and Policy Conference held at Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law (April 4, 1997) (stating that "I do not accept.., that there is dilution.
Dilution is an assertion, not a fact."). Justice Jacob stated that trademark owner's were
not previously given any additional protectin outside of protection against a likelihood
of confusion. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
1998]
916 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:861
II. THE DEBATE OVER WHETHER THE EUROPEAN UNION
SHOULD REVISE THE TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE TO INCLUDE
A PROVISION PROTECTING TRADEMARKS FROM DILUTION
Legal Scholars and judges disagree on whether trademarks
are deserving of protection against unauthorized uses that dilute
the trademark, but do not cause a likelihood of confusion.325
Those legal scholars and judges who favor offering trademarks
protection against dilution note that the function of trademarks
has expanded and that dilution damages a trademark.326 Those
legal scholars and judges who are against protecting trademarks
from uses that cause dilution are fearful that dilution protection
will afford trademark owner's monopolies in words. Addition-
ally, these scholars assert that dilution does not address a real
injury and that the function of trademarks has not expanded
outside of the designation of source of origin.
A. Arguments in Favor of Offering Trademarks Protection Against
Dilution
One of the primary arguements advanced by legal scholars
and judges as to why trademarks should be provided protection
against uses that cause diluition is that the functional aspects of
trademarks have expanded. 27 Courts, legal scholars, and legisla-
tures, additionally, have noted that trademarks should be pro-
tected against uses that cause dilution because dilution damages
the trademark.3 28  Finally, trademarks should be protected
325. See Baywatch, [1997] F.S.R. at 30 (refusing to protect trademark because unau-
thorized use did not result in likelihood of confusion); Claeryn, 7 I.I.C. at 426 (stating
that trademarks deserve 'protection against unauthorized uses regardless of presence of
likelihood of confusion).
326. Trademarks are damaged by unauthorized uses because the trademark's abil-
ity to identify the source of goods bearing the trademark is diminshed. Horowitz, supra
note 156, at S7. The dilution damage threatens to destroy the trademark's uniqueness,
singularity, and capacity to identify the source of goods sold with the trademark affixed
to it. Id.
327. See Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 484-90 (discussing expanded function of
trademarks and noting that trademarks function to advertise and promote product);
Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205 (recognizing advertising function of trademarks).
328. See Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemschrift 502; XXV Marken-
shutz Und Wettbewerb 264, September 11, 1925 (protecting trademark owner against
use of same trademark on non-competing product and terming this protection dilu-
tion); Uniform Benelux Trade Mark Law art. 13(a)(2) (stating that trademark owners
may oppose any other economic uses of same or similar trademark); Claeryn, 7 I.I.C. at
426 (protecting trademark owner from use of similar trademark on non-competing
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against dilution because the U.S. policies underlying trademark
support protecting tradmarks from dilution. 29
1. Trademarks Function as Advertising Agents and Consumers
Now Associate the Trademark with the Product
According to several legal scholars, trademarks have devel-
oped a function whereby they advertise the good to the pub-
lic.330 Frank I. Schechter, the legal scholar who originated the
concept of dilution,33 1 asserted that trademarks serve as more
than an indicator of source and that the confusion doctrine does
not protect these functional aspects of trademarks. 32
Schechter's thesis went against the notion that the primary func-
tion of a trademark was to serve as a source indicator.3 Instead,
he argued that the primary function of a trademark was that of a
marketing or advertising tool which exhibited drawing power to
stimulate consumers to purchase a certain good.3 3 4 Legal schol-
ars note that Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter recognized the
expanded advertising function of a trademark, and that he re-
ferred to it as a trademark's commercial magnetism.
335
product); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (offering famous trademarks protection from uses that di-
lute their value or distinctiveness); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laborato-
ries Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006, 2013 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining that novelty credit
card with attached condom resembled American Express's well known trademarked
credit card and, therefore, might tarnish American Express's reputation, thereby, dilut-
ing American Express's trademark); Swann & Davis, supra note 35, at 274 (asserting
that dilution damages trademark by distorting trademark's image among consumers).
329.
330. See Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 484-90 (noting that function of trade-
marks has expanded to include advertising and product promotion); Grimes & Bat-
tersby, supra note 35, at 431-32 (proposing that trademarks have marketing tool func-
tion that needs protection); Swann & Davis, supra note 35, at 274 (recognizing advertis-
ing function of trademarks and terming this function as trademark's economic
function); Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205 (recognizing advertising function of trademarks).
331. See Schechter, supra note 8, at 822-26.
332. Id. at 822.
333. See id. at 814 (noting that 400 years ago trademarks did indicate product's
origin, but that it does not perform this function today). The original function of a
trademark was to "represent to a consumer the physical source or origin of the product
with which the mark was used." Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 482.
334. Schechter, supra note 8, at 818-19. The function of trademarks expanded in
the late 1920s and early 1930s to include that of advertising. Hanson & Walls, supra
note 6, at 482-84.
335. Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205; see Hanson & Walls, supra note 6, at 486 (noting
thatJustice Frankfurter stated trademarks were merchandising short-cuts that conveyed
advertising information to consumers in order to convey desirability of products). Jus-
tice Frankfurter explained that a trademark acquired this commercial magnetism from
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Under Benelux law, trademarks are also considered to have
an expanded advertising function.3 3 6 According to Benelux
trademark law, trademarks do not function as indicators of ori-
gin, instead trademarks distinguish goods and services. A
trademark's advertising function involves the publicity surround-
ing a trademark which constantly infers the trademark name to
the public, resulting in good will.338 Allowing dilution will result
in a loss of this good will because the public will no longer solely
associate the trademark name with a single good, product, or
manufacturer, instead the consuming public will associate the
trademark with multiple goods, products, or manufacturers.339
Schechter also contended that consumers form a mental as-
sociation between the trademark and the product, not between
the trademark and the producer. 4 ° Similarly, Schechter's views
were later echoed by Supreme CourtJustice Frankfurter who be-
lieved that consumers psychologically associate the trademark
with the product and that trademarks induce consumers to
purchase products. 341 The psychological aspect of a consumers
association between trademarks and products needs to be pro-
tected because once a consumer develops this recognition, the
trademark owner has something of value. 4 2
the actions of a trademark owner which "impregnate the atmosphere of the market
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol." Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205. In Misha-
waka, Justice Frankfurter was not attempting to expand the protection afforded trade-
marks, he was merely describing the functional aspects of trademarks. Hanson & Walls,
supra note 6, at 486.
336. See Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks art. I (stating that trademarks serve
to distinguish goods and services not to indicate origin).
337. Id.
338. See id. (discussing functional aspect of trademarks in Benelux countries).
339. See Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protec-
tion:" Control of Quality and Dilution - Estranged Bedfellows ?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65,
72 (1990) (noting that dilution causes consumer to think about two or more producers,
instead of one, when associating trademark with product, thus damaging trademark's
communicative value).
340. Schechter, supra note 8, at 822. Schechter stated that the true function of a
trademark was "to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby stimulate further
purchases by the consuming public." Id. at 818.
341. Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205. Justice Frankfurter stated that a trademark's
function was to convey, "in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears." Id.
342. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stat-
ing that "[o]nce the manufacturer has achieved the consumer's association of the
trademark with the quality and desirability of the manufacturer's products, then this
symbol has gained a commercial value recognized and protected under the law."); Han-
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2. Dilution Damages a Trademark
The courts, legislatures, and legal scholars in the Benelux
countries, Germany, and the United States have recognized that
dilution damages a trademark.343 Legal scholars assert that the
damage to a trademark due to dilution is far more severe than
the damage to a trademark due to confusion. 44 The damage a
trademark owner suffers from confusion caused by an infringing
mark is, generally, a loss of one sale45 As long as the quality of
the good does not disappoint the consumer, no brand loyalty is
lost, and the consumer will continue to buy the trademark own-
ers product.3 46 The damage caused by the negative association,
due to dilution, distorts the image that the purchaser and poten-
tial purchaser has towards the trademark.347 For example, the
Coca-Cola Company would suffer less economic damage from
having an occasional consumer, who wants a can of Coke, mis-
son & Walls, supra note 6, at 490 (stating that trademarks through consumer association
develop good will thai is of value to trademark owners). Hanson and Walls state that
this good will has a value to the trademark owner and that it should be legally protected
against unauthorized appropriations. Id.
343. See See Uniform Benelux Trade Mark Law art. 13(a) (2) (stating that trade-
mark owners may oppose any other economic uses of same or similar trademark);
Claeryn/Klarein 7 I.I.C. 420 (1975) (protecting trademark owner from use of similar
trademark on non-competing product); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (offering famous trademarks
protection from uses that dilute their value or distinctiveness); Civil Court, Elberfield,
25 Juristische Wochemschrift 502; XXV Markenshutz Und Wettbewerb 264, September
11, 1925 (protecting trademark owner against use of same trademark on non-compet-
ing product and terming this protection dilution); Dilution damages a trademark by
diminishing the trademark's ability to identify the source of goods bearing the trade-
mark. Horowitz & Prager, supra note 156, at S7. Damage due to dilution harms the
trademark's uniqueness, singularity, and capacity to identify the source of goods sold
with the trademark affixed to it. Id. Dilution primarily damages the mental associa-
tions that consumers have with respect to a trademark. Trademark owners are con-
cerned that the damage due to dilution will affect the consumers' mental impressions
of the trademark, resulting in a decrease in sales. Trademark owners are also con-
cerned that the consumers' impressions will be altered by the use of an identical or
similar trademark. Swann & Davis, supra note 35, at 274; see, e.g., Trial Transcript at
197-98, 274, Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Ass., Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1545 (N.D. Ga. 1993). The owner of the Cabbage Patch Kids property stated that
she was afraid that the Garbage Pail Kids Stickers would make consumers associate the
Cabbage Patch Kids trademark with "uncoolness". Id.
344. Swann & Davis, supra note at 35, 274.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. The damage due to the purchaser's tarnished association "attacks the at-
tributes of the brand itself and overtly distorts [the trademarks] image both among
purchasers and potential purchasers." Id.
920 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:861
takenly purchase a can of Pepsi, than having the consumer asso-
ciate Coke with cocaine. 34
8
U.S. case law surrounding dilution further establishes that
dilution damages a trademark. 49 In Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Ris-
ing, Inc. ,35' a poster manufacturer was selling posters that had
the phrase Enjoy Cocaine written across them.15 ' This slogan
was written in the same stylized script and in the same colors as
that of a registered Coca-Cola trademark, Enjoy Coca-Cola.15 2
The Gemini Rising court stated that, in the strictest trademark
sense, there was no confusion, but that the poster had impaired
the selling power of Coca-Cola's trademark because of the nega-
tive association in the consumers' mind.353
3. Encourages Policies Underlying Trademark Law
Protecting trademarks from dilution maintains and encour-
ages the policies underlying trademark law. 354 First, dilution
protection offers trademark owners a way to protect the good-
will that is generated and surrounds their trademarks.3 55 The
maintenance of this good-will is critical to the success of the
trademarked product.3 56 Also, this type of protection further
prevents free-riders from utilizing the success and investment of
others.3 5 7 Second, protecting trademarks from dilution does not
348. Id.
349. See American Express, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2013 (finding that novelty credit card
with attached condom, that resembled American Express's well known trademarked
credit card, might tarnish American Express's reputation and thereby dilute trade-
mark); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chev-
rolet, 855 F.2d 480, 482-85 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that trademarked slogan, "The
Greatest Show on Earth," for well known circus was tarnished by advertisement for used
car dealer using slogan "The Greatest Car Show on Earth"); but see Ringling Bros.-Bar-
num & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris Am. Lines, 321 F. Supp. 707, 713
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that well known circus trademark, "The Greatest Show on
Earth," was not tarnished by a cruise line using the slogan "The Greatest Show on Earth
Isn't" in advertisements).
350. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1191. The Gemini Rising court did not rely entirely on dilution for a
finding of infringement. Id. at 1192. Instead, the Gemini Rising court stated that several
letters Coca-Cola had received inquiring about the offensive posters justified a finding
of confusion. Id.
354. See Hansen, supra note 96.
355. Id.
356. Id,
357. Id.
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thwart or prevent interbrand competition. Nor does it confer a
monopoly onto the trademark owner.""
B. Arguements Against Offering Trademarks Dilution Protection
Map
1. Protecting Against Dilution Affords Trademark Owner a
Monopoly
Critics of dilution are wary that if trademark owners are of-
fered protection from dilution that they will receive a monopoly
in the language composing the trademark.359 They believe that
any and all trademark owners will be granted exclusive use of
their trademark. These critics believe that this will prevent
others from entering the marketplace and competing effectively
on similar and non-similar goods.
2. The Function of Trademarks Has Not Expanded
In Wagamama, the UK Court of Chancery rejected the no-
tion that trademarks now serve as advertising entities. 6 ° Many
critics of dilution agree with this and argue that trademarks only
serve the sole function of designating the source of origin of a
good.36' Therefore, they contend that dilution protection is not
necessary for trademarks because the origination function is not
damaged by dilution.3 62
3. Dilution Protection Does Not Address a Real Injury
The dilution doctrine has not been embraced by some legal
scholars because they do not accept that dilution actually dam-
358. See Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trade-
marks: Anti-competitive "Monopoly" or Earned 'Property" Right?, 47 Ft. L. REv. 653, 707-08
(1995) (agreeing with scholars who have stated that protecting trademarks from dilu-
tion actually contributes to competitive economic environment and does not promote
anti-competitive monopolies); Mead Data, 702 F. Supp. at 1031 (noting that dilution
doctrine guards against monopolization of common words).
359. See Milton Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Comparable with the National
Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 278 (1985) (stating that protecting
trademarks from dilution "could result in an undesirable monopolization of lan-
guage").
360. See Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 730.
361.
362.
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ages a trademark. 6 ' Further, even if dilution does damage a
trademark, these scholars believe protection is still inappropriate
because the damage is ephemeral.364 Their views criticize the
metaphors used to describe how dilution damages a trade-
mark,365 and stress the lack of empirical proof and support for
actual dilution.366
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD ADOPT PROTECTION
AGAINST DILUTION OF TRADEMARKS
Throughout their evolution, trademarks have taken on ad-
ditional functions which require additional protection outside
that afforded by the confusion doctrine.3 67 The Benelux coun-
tries, Germany, and the United States have responded to this
new requirement, adopting protection for trademarks against
uses which dilute the trademark's distinctiveness, provided that
the trademark is famous, strong, and has a national reputa-
tion.368 Initially, it appeared that the European Union also re-
sponded to these changes and adopted protection against uses
that dilute famous trademarks.
This potential protection was located in Article 5
paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the 1989 Trademark Directive. 69
When faced with trademark infringement cases involving these
provisions, however, the Chancery Division of the United King-
dom responded that there could never be trademark infringe-
ment unless there was a showing of confusion as to source of
363. SeeJonathan E. Moskin, Dilution Law: At A Crossroad? Dilution or Delusion: The
Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 130-33 (1993) (asserting
that dilution does not damage trademark); Welkowitz, supra note 183, at 533 (stating
that dilution's " existence seems a tenuous proposition at best.").
364. See Moskin, supra note 363, at 130-33 (stating that dilution is psychological
phenomenon that is unobservable and cannot be detected or proven); Welkowitz, supra
note 183, at 531, 538-43 (discussing dilution ans asserting that dilution does not dam-
age trademark).
365. See Moskin, supra note 363, at 130-33; Welkowitz, supra note 183, at 538-43
366. See Moskin, supra note 363, at 172-76; Welkowitz, supra note 183, at 531.
367. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text (discussing expanded functions
of trademarks).
368. See supra notes 163-68, 208-59, 264-69 and accompanying text (detailing how
Benelux countries, Germany, and United States have protected trademarks from dilu-
tion, thereby, protecting expanded functions of trademarks).
369. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text (discussing Trademark Direc-
tive provisions relating to trademark infringement and protection to be afforded trade-
marks).
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origin. 70 In order to properly offer trademarks total protection,
therefore, the European Union must either revise the 1989
Trademark Directive, providing precise guidelines stating that
trademarks can be infringed without confusion, or issue a new
Trademark Dilution Directive, providing strong and famous
trademarks with protection against uses that dilute the trade-
mark.
A. Protecting Against Dilution is Supported by the Policies Underlying
Trademark Law
Protecting trademarks from uses which cause dilution is
warranted because this type of protection comports with the pol-
icies underlying trademark law. One of the central policies for
protecting trademarks is the protection of the good will which
trademark owners create through the use of the trademark.
37
*
This goodwill is not damaged exclusively by uses of the trade-
mark which cause confusion, it also can be damaged in uses that
do not confuse the consumer. Examples of this type of damag-
ing use are parodies involving a trademark, like the Babewatch
series 372 or the John Deere advertisement," 3 and production of
non-similar products of bad quality. 374 These types of uses de-
tract from the consumer's attitudes towards the trademark, but
in no way confuse the consumer as to the source of origin.
3 75
The confusion doctrine, therefore, does not offer a method of
protecting trademarks from these damaging uses and another
source of protection, namely the dilution doctrine, is required.
The policies of protecting interbrand competition and
preventing monopolies376 also support offering trademarks pro-
370. See supra notes 279-321 and accompanying text (discussing UK cases,
Wagamam and Baywatch, wherein Chancory Division refused to extend trademark pro-
tection to situtions without presence of likelihood of confusion).
371. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (defining and detailing policy
known as good will).
372. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text (discussing Babewatch series
and Baywatch).
373. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussingJohn Deere adver-
tisement parody).
374. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (detailing how inferior quality
products damage trademark via dilution).
375. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing how trademarks can be
damaged without consumer confusion).
376. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (explaining policies of protec-
tion of interbrand competition and preventing monopolies).
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tection from dilution. Granting trademark owners dilution pro-
tection does not thwart interbrand competition, nor does it con-
fer a monopoly to the trademark owner. This is the case because
a competitor does not require the use of another competitor's
trademark to effectively compete. Legal scholars, furthermore,
have stated that protecting trademarks from dilution actually en-
hances, instead of hinders, competition. 77 Additionally, other
aspects of trademark law, such as the requirements for obtaining
a trademark and the concept of genericism,3  prevent compa-
nies from thwarting competition by trademarking words re-
quired for effective competition.
An example of dilution not thwarting competition is the
Coca-Cola company and their trademark Coke. Competitors of
the Coca-Cola Company do not need the Coke trademark to
compete, and therefore, any use of the trademark that damages
Coca-Cola should be prevented, even absent any confusion.
Uses of the trademark Coke, as in references to cocaine or as a
trademark for a poor quality automobile, dilute the strength of
the trademark and are not necessary for effective competition.
These uses merely tarnish379 the trademark and dilute the
strength and recognition of the trademark. Furthermore, Pep-
sico, and their trademark Pepsi, demonstrate that granting Coca-
Cola dilution protection for the trademark Coke does not in-
hibit a competitor from entering an industry and succeeding.
Dilution protection for trademarks, therefore, is supported by
the policies underlying trademark law and the protection should
be granted.
Furthermore, the function of trademarks has expanded to
advertising ° and now it is necessary to protect this function.
Initially, trademarks only served as indicators of source of origin,
but as one scholar noted that function has altered overtime. s1
Today, trademarks are everywhere, yet for the most part they do
377. See supra note 358 and accompanying text (discussing how protecting trade-
marks from dilution enhances competition).
378. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (detailing restraints that prevent
trademark owners from thwarting competition).
379. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (describing tarnishment and
stating how it damages and dilutes trademarks).
380. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of trade-
mark's function to advertising).
381. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (detailing Frank Schechter's
views as to how trademarks function as advertising agents).
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not function as indicators of the source of origin of a good.3" 2
The brand recognition that consumers rely on in making their
purchases occurs because the consumer has been enticed by ad-
vertisements to purchase that good, not because of the origina-
tion point of the good.
. Uses of the same trademark on different goods weakens this
advertising function. If multiple types of goods are all referred
to by the name of a famous trademark, the consumer, while not
believing the goods are produced by the same company, will as-
sociate the strong trademark with the other good. If this contin-
ues, overtime the trademark will not have any value.
B., Trademarks are Able to Become so Large that Confusion is
Impossible
Another reason why trademarks must be offered protection
against uses that dilute the trademark, and do not cause confu-
sion, is that certain trademarks are able to become so powerful
and so well known that confusion is no longer possible. McDon-
ald's and Coca-Cola both own numerous trademarks and have
established themselves as world leaders in their respective fields
of fast-food and soft-drinks. Due to the fact that these trade-
marks and their accompanying goods are known worldwide by
nearly every human being, the likelihood of confusion is ex-
tremely minimal.
Unless the competitor combines the words which compose
the trademarks with their respective pictorial symbols, consumer
confusion as to source of origin is unlikely. A blue car that says
Coke on it or a pair of socks that says McDonald's are not likely
to be thought of as coming from the Coca-Cola Company or Mc-
Donald's. These goods, however, will cause a subliminal associa-
tion between the goods and the two companies. If these goods
are of an inferior quality, McDonald's and Coca-Cola will indi-
rectly lose some of their good will due to this association.
C. Trademark Directive was Drafted so as to Offer Trademarks
Dilution Protection
As noted, it appeared that the European Union accepted
the concept of dilution and instituted EU wide protection for
382. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text (discussing how trademarks no
longer serve predominantly as designators of good's source of origin).
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trademarks against diluting uses."' 3 This protection was meant
to be located in the phrase likelihood of association, found in
Article 5 paragraph 1 (b) of the Trademark Directive,384 and also
in the additional protection afforded to trademarks with a repu-
tation, found in Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Trademark Direc-
tive."' The UK, however, did not follow this view in either
Baywatch 86 or Wagamama.387
Wagamama was correctly decided since the Chancery Divi-
sion did protect the Wagamama trademark, but the court should
have offered protection under the concept of likelihood of asso-
ciation regardless of the presence or absence of confusion. The
second restaurant RAJAMAMA or as it was later named RAJA
MAMA's was a similar trademark used upon similar goods.388
The closeness of the wording and the similarity of the sound of
the trademark definitely caused consumers to form a mental as-
sociation between the two restaurants. RAJAMAMA, therefore,
would, be usurping some of the goodwill associated with
WAGAMAMA.
In Wagamama, the court stated that the phrase likelihood of
association did not expand the protection to be offered a trade-
mark as the precise wording was a likelihood of confusion which
includes a likelihood of association.3 89 The court and commen-
tators rationalized that because the association clause comes af-
ter the confusion clause that it does not add additional types of
protection, but that association is another species of the genus
confusion. The Chancery Division, therefore, states that any as-
sociation between two trademarks will not be protected against,
regardless of the damage to the trademark, unless a likelihood
383. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing rationale behind
EU's adoption of likelihood of association).
384. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing article 5 paragraph 1 of
Trademark Directive).
385. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (describing article 5 paragraph 2 of
Trademark Directive).
386. See supra notes 304-21 and accompanying text (discussing UK's Chancery Divi-
sion's decision in Baywatch)
387. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text (explaining UK's Chancery Di-
vision's decision in Wagamama).
388. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text (discussing infringer in
Wagamama case).
389. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing Chancery Divisions in-
terpretation of phrase likelihood of association).
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of confusion is also present.390
This rationale is flawed due to the use of the words genus
and species. The genus of an item represents a less specific group-
ing of that item than does the heading species. Thus, there are
more items under a given genus than under a given species. For
example, there are five mammals under the genus Mustela391 in
North America, however, each of the five animals has their own
species, namely erminea, rixosa, frenata, nigripes, and vison. 9 2 In
this situation, whenever one of the five species is present there is
automatically a member of the genus present. The reverse, how-
ever, is not true. Therefore, whenever the trademark infringe-
ment species known as association is present, there would auto-
matically be. the trademark, infringement genus confusion pres-
ent. Thus, the test for confusion would be pre-empted and
unnecessary if association is present.
Furthermore, the Chancery Division refused to accept that
the Commission enacted the phrase likelihood of association
with the intent of utilizing the Benelux interpretation of this
phrase. 93 Because the Commission did not define likelihood of
association, then the UK court was free to interpret the state-
ment as not granting trademarks additional protection when a
likelihood of confusion was not present. The problem
presented here is not the courts ruling, however, as courts are
granted discretion in interpreting statutes that are not precisely
defined, but that the Commission failed to define the phrase
likelihood of association. While the intention of the Commis-
sion appears to be that Article 5 paragraph 1 (b) extends trade-
mark protection to situations involving no confusion, the Com-
mission failed to specifically annunciate this.
The Commission, therefore, should rectify this by issuing an
amendment or a revision to the Trademark Directive which ex-'
plicitly sets out the definition for likelihood of association.
390. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing UK Chancery Division's
findings that trademarks should never be granted protection absent likelihood of con-
fusion)
391. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DIcTIoNARY 893 (1991) (stating that
term Mustela represents genus of "numerous carnivorous mammals of the family Muste-
lidae, comprising the weasels, martens, skunks, badgers, and otters.").
392. See WILLIAM H. BURT AND RICHARD P. GROSSENHEIDER, A FIELD GUIDE TO THE
MAMMALS 55-60 (1980) (listing and describing members of genius Mustela).
393. See supra 293 note and accompanying text (discussing motivation behind in-
clusion of likelihood of association in Trademark Directive).
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When it does this, the Commission should define it as a protec-
tion afforded a trademark whenever that trademark is called to a
consumer's mind by another trademark regardless of the pres-
ence of any confusion or any likelihood of confusion as to
source of origin. The Commission should further state that all
Member States must utilize Benelux case law in interpreting and
understanding the concept of a likelihood of association. Fi-
nally, the Commission should affix a list of cases that courts
should refer to for guidance in applying the likelihood of associ-
ation.
While Wagamama reached the right decision under the
wrong analysis, Baywatch was wrongly decided. The Chancery Di-
vision again interpreted the phrase likelihood of association
from Article 5 paragraph 1 (b) of the Trademark Directive as not
expanding the protection afforded a trademark to realms where
a likelihood of confusion was present. 94 Unlike Wagamama, in
Baywatch, the Chancery Division had the opportunity to inter-
pret Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Trademark Directive.39 This
provision provides trademarks with protection against uses on
non-similar goods if the trademark's reputation or distinctive are
damaged.396 In its ruling, the Chancery Division stated that Arti-
cle 5 paragraph 2 offered no protection to a trademark unless a
likelihood of confusion was also present.397
The Chancery Division's interpretation of Article 5 para-
graph 2 is erroneous because there is no support for its conclu-
sion that a likelihood of confusion is mandated by this para-
graph. Their rationale that paragraph 2 is not able to expand
the protect afforded by paragraph 2 is flawed. Paragraph 2 is a
separate entity from paragraph 1. If it were intended to flow
with paragraph 1, the Commission likely would have labeled it as
paragraph 1 section c.
In Baywatch, the Babewatch series was clearly intended to
394. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text (discussing Chancery Division's
interpretation of likelihood of association).
395. See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text (stating claims brought by
plaintiff in Baywatch)
396. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing Trademark Directive's
article 5 paragraph 2).
397. See supra notes 284-95 and accompanying text (explaining Chancery Divi-
sion's interpretation of article 5 paragraph 2 of Trademark Directive).
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imitate the Baywatch series.398 By utilizing images characteristic
of Baywatch in a pornographic movie, the reputation of the
Baywatch trademark was tarnished. Furthermore, the only rea-
son Babewatch imitated these scenes was to utilize some of the
goodwill of Baywatch, thereby, increasing sales of the porno-
graphic movie.3 99
This type of situation confronted courts in the United States
in the Debbie Does Dallas4 ° ° case. In that situation, trademark in-
fringement was found based upon the fact that the Dallas Cow-
boys trademark-was being tarnished by its use in a pornographic
movie.40' If Baywatch were held in the United States the Trade-
mark Dilution Act would control.4"2 Utilizing the popularity of
Baywatch in the United Kingdom, under U.S. law, Baywatch
would earn the status of a famous trademark due to its popular-
ity, renown and reputation, and strength of the trademark. The
U.S. courts likely would hold that use of a famous trademark in a
pornographic movie constitutes infringement via dilution. A
U.S. court would find that Babewatch was free-riding off of the
reputation and good will of Baywatch. The court would almost
definitely conclude that a pornographic movie, even if claimed
to be a parody or social commentary, would tarnish the reputa-
tion of Baywatch. This view is consistent with U.S. courts views in
Debbie Does Dallas and Gemini Rising.4"3
Additionally, offering Baywatch dilution protection would
not confer to them a monopoly. The makers of Babewatch did
not need to utilize a trademark similar to Baywatch in order to
effectively compete in a market place, nor did they need it to
produce their pornographic movie. By ruling that Babewatch
could not continue to utilize the name Babewatch, the red life-
guard suits, and the characteristic scenes of Baywatch, the U.S.
court would not hinder the manufacturers of Babewatch from
398. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between
Babewatch and Baywatch).
399. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing trademark owner's
good will in trademark).
400. See supra notes 230-51 and accompanying text (discussing Debbie Does Dallas).
401. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (describing holding in Debbie
Does Dallas).
402. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act).
403. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text (discussing Gemini Rising).
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producing other pornographic movies. They would merely be
precluded from producing movies that called to mind Baywatch.
Benelux courts would follow the ruling of the U.S. courts.
Under the modified Benelux Trademark Law,4 0 4 Benelux courts
would first analyze whether Baywatch had garnered a reputation.
Again, utilizing the fame and ratings. of Baywatch in the UK,
Baywatch would gain this reputation. Next, the Benelux court
would examine whether Babewatch was a use that economically
hindered Baywatch. The court likely would hold that Babewatch
usurped Baywatch's good will and tarnished Baywatch's trade-
mark, thereby, economically damaging it.
As in Wagamama, any error in Baywatch can be attributed to
the Commission's failure to provide any guidance for how courts
should interpret Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Trademark Direc-
tive. To rectify this situation, the Commission should issue a re-
vision or amendment to the Trademark Directive. In this revi-
sion or amendment, the Commission should set out explicit de-
tails for how Article 5 paragraph 2 should be applied. The
Commission should state that this provision protects trademarks
that have a reputation from uses on non-similar products when
that use dilutes, meaning takes unfair advantage of, or is detri-
mental to the character or repute of the trademark, regardless of
whether or not confusion or a likelihood of confusion is present.
Additionally, the Commission should establish guidelines to
be utilized in determining whether or not a trademark has a rep-
utation. The Commission's reputation guidelines should mirror
those annunciated by the U.S. legislature in the U.S. Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.4 5 These criteria are demonstrative of
what a famous trademark or a trademark with a reputation will
look like. Furthermore, the fact that the list is not all inclusive
allows courts flexibility so that they can apply the criteria to di-
verse and novel situations.
CONCLUSION
The European Union should remove the phrase likelihood
of association from the Trademark Directive, thereby, eliminat-
404. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing modifications to
Benelux Trademark Law in response to Trademark Directive).
405. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (listing guidelines to be utilized by
U.S. courts in determining whether trademark is famous).
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ing any confusion that this phrase may cause. Furthermore, the
European Union should revise the Trademark Directive or issue
a Trademark Dilution Directive mandating that Member States
provide the owners of famous trademark, like Baywatch and
Wagamama, with protection against uses which cause dilution of
the trademark. Offering trademark owners this type of protec-
tion is justified by the policies underlying U.S. trademark law, as
well as being necessitated by the expanded functional aspects of
trademarks.
